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Case No. 20141155-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff!Appellee,
V.

KEN MONTEY JOHNSON,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for one count of burglary, a second
degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (West 2015).

This Court has

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015).

INTRODUCTION
While drunk, Defendant kicked in the back doors of his ex-wife's home,
took her cell phone as she called 911, yelled at her, and feinted punches at her
face. He then threatened to push her down the stairs before leaving with her
phone.
Defendant admitted that he forcibly entered his ex-wife's home, took her
phone, and fled. But he denied threatening her, and he argued that he did not
commit burglary because he did not intend to keep the phone permanently, but

took it only to stop his ex-wife from calling police. Although he admitted that
he ultimately destroyed the phone, he claimed that he decided to do so only
after seeing police at her home when he returned to give it back. The jury was
mostly unpersuaded and convicted Defendant of burglary, but acquitted him of
making a violent threat.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Jury Instruction 32 stated that to commit theft, Defendant had to take
II

another's property with a purpose to deprive him thereof"; it then red ted the
statutory definition of "purpose to deprive" verbatim.
II

Did the instructions correctly define purpose to deprive?"

Standard of Review. The accuracy of jury instructions are reviewed for
correctness. State v. Maama, 2015 UT App 235, if 29, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 24.
2. A week after the burglary, Defendant left a voicemail on his ex-wife's
phone in which he admitted to breaking into her home. He also used the £word twice and sounded upset.
Was the probative value of the voicemail substantially outweighed by
any danger for unfair prejudice?

Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ,r12,
345 P.3d 1195.
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3. When a recess took longer than expected, the trial court announced its
intention to go to the jury room and explain the reasons for the delay. Defense
counsel agreed to that plan.
When the jury asked during deliberations to hear again recordings that
had been admitted into evidence, the trial court explained that it would have
the prosecutor show the bailiff how to play the recordings for the jury. Defense
counsel did not object, and asked only that he be allowed to hear the
prosecutor's instructions to the bailiff about how to play the recordings.
Was trial counsel ineffective for agreeing to these jury contacts?

Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, ,Il6,
247 P.3d 344.

4. After defense counsel repeatedly used the victim's written witness
statement on cross-examination to show that it did not contain some of the
details that she had testified to, the trial court admitted the entire oneparagraph statement as a prior consistent statement under rule 801(d)(1)(B),
Utah Rules of Evidence, and under the rule of completeness in rule 106, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that fairness required
admitting the victim's entire witness statement?
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Standard of Review. See Issue 2.
5.

Does the cumulative error doctrine apply where Defendant

demonstrates no error, or at most one harmless error?

Standard of Review. None applies.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains:
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (West 2015) (burglary);
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401 (West 2015) (definitions for theft);
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West 2015) (theft);
Utah R. Evid. 106;
Utah R. Evid. 403;
Utah R. Evid. 801.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts. 1

Defendant left a voice message for his ex-wife, Barbara Johnson, warning
that he was headed to her home and demanding that she "talk to him."
R347:83,86.
words."

Defendant

R347:86-87.

II

sounded extremely drunk" and was "slurring his

Within a

II

few minutes" of listening to the message,

Barbara heard a pounding on her back glass doors and saw Defendant
repeatedly kicking them. R347:87-88.
1

According to well-established appellate standards, the State recites the
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict and presents conflicting evidence
only when necessary to understand the appellate issues. See State v. Heaps, 2005
UT 5, i[2, 999 P.2d 565.
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When the door frame broke, Defendant entered Barbara's home
screaming and yelling. R347:88,93. Barbara dialed 911 on her cell phone, but
accidentally hung up because she was scared and "shaking like crazy."
R347:88-89. When the 911 operator called back, Defendant grabbed the phone
from Barbara's hand, feinted punches to her face, and continued to yell in
slurred words that he had to talk to her. R347:89-90.
Defendant then headed for the front door with Barbara's phone. R347:90.
Barbara followed, grabbing for her phone and begging Defendant to return it.
R347:90,140. As the two stood on the landing at the front door of the split-level
home, Defendant grabbed Barbara and threatened, "I should throw you down
the stairs right now." R347:91. Barbara retreated and Defendant fled out the
door and sped off in his truck. R347:91-92.

Defendant's version
Defendant testified that he went to Barbara's home because he wanted to
talk to her about a debt that he believed she owed him under their divorce
decree. R347:119-21;R348:22-23. Defendant admitted to kicking in the doors,
entering Barbara's home, taking her cellphone, and leaving with the phone.
R348:23-25. But he said that he never touched or threatened Barbara while in
her home. R348:28-29. He also said that he took her phone only to stop her
from calling police. R348:25-26. Defendant claimed that he went back an hour
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later to return the phone, but that he got upset and smashed it when he saw
police at Barbara's house. R348:25-26.
Defendant told the jury that he pied guilty to a charge of interrupting a
communications device because he took Barbara's phone to prevent her from
calling police. R348:24. He also admitted that he pied guilty to a theft charge
because he destroyed Barbara's phone. R348:25-28.
B.

Summary of proceedings.

The State charged Defendant with one count each of:
burglary, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202
(West 2015);
damaging or interrupting a communication device, a class B
misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-108 (West 2015);
making a threat of violence, a class B misdemeanor, Utah Code
Ann. §76-5-107 (West 2015); and
theft, a class B misdemeanor, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West
2015).
R206-08.
On the day of trial, Defendant pied guilty to the interrupting a
communication device and theft charges. R230-32. A jury convicted Defendant
of burglary, but acquitted him of making a violent threat. R247,297. He appeals
only his burglary conviction. Br.Aplt. 1-3, 50.
The trial court sentenced Defendant to prison for one to fifteen years on
the burglary count and to two jail terms of 180 days on the misdemeanor
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counts. R315-16. The trial court suspended the prison and jail terms and placed
Defendant on probation for 36 months, granted him credit for the 102 days he
had already served, and released him. R315-16. Defendant timely appealed.
R317.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant argues that the jury instructions did not clearly explain that
to be guilty of burglary based on the intent to commit theft, he had to enter or
remain in Barbara's home with the intent to permanently deprive her of her
cellphone. Defendant concedes that the instructions required the jury to find
that he entered or remained in Barbara's home with the specific intent to
commit a theft, but argues that the instructions did not clearly explain that theft
requires intent to permanently deprive another of her property.
On the contrary, the instructions explained that theft required Defendant
to act with the "purpose to deprive" Barbara of her cellphone, and then quoted
II

the statutory definition of purpose to deprive." That definition explained that
11

purpose to deprive" included intending to permanently deprive another of her

property. And the remainder of the definition precluded the jury from finding
Defendant guilty of a theft-based burglary charge if it found that he intended to
keep her phone only temporarily.
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At defense counsel's request, the court also instructed the jury on the
elements of wrongful appropriation- which requires only an intent to
temporarily deprive another of her property.

Contrary to Defendant's

assertion, the trial court was not required to repeat in that instruction the
principle that theft required an intent to permanently deprive, because other
instructions had already explained that principle.
Defendant argues that the trial court's answers to the jury's questions
during deliberations mislead the jury regarding the elements of burglary. He is
mistaken. When the jury asked whether Defendant had to possess the intent to
commit a theft before he entered the home, the court correctly explained that
Defendant could form that intent either before entry, or while remaining in the
home. When the jury asked why the elements of wrongful appropriation were
included in the instructions, the trial court correctly told the jury to answer that
question for themselves. Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the trial court was
not required to repeat that theft required intent to permanently deprive.
II. Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted under rule
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, a 41-second clip of a voicemail that Defendant left
for Barbara a week after the burglary.

In that clip, Defendant admits to

breaking into Barbara's home. He also uses the £-word twice and sounds upset.
Any potential for unfair prejudice from this clip did not substantially outweigh
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its probative value.

Rule 403 presumes admissibility.

Here,

Defendant

admitted to key elements of burglary in the voicemail, and the fact that he was
upset with Barbara tended to prove that he broke into her home intending to
threaten or to steal from her, or both. His use of the £-word twice did not create
the potential for unfair prejudice.
III. Defendant argues that the trial court had improper contact with the
jury when, outside of counsel's and defendant's presence, it explained why a
recess was taking longer than expected. He also argues that the bailiff had
improper contact with the jury when the bailiff replayed during deliberations
recordings (Barbara's 911 call and the clip of Defendant's voicemail) that had
been admitted into evidence. Defendant did not preserve either argument and
in fact invited any error by agreeing to both jury contacts. This Court therefore
may not review this issue for plain error.
Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting
to the contacts because conceivable strategic reasons explain the lack of
objections. By allowing the trial court to explain the delay to the jury, counsel
reduced the likelihood that the jury would become frustrated with the
proceedings and irritated with counsel. Counsel also could have reasonably
concluded that the court's discussion of scheduling matters with the jury would
be an innocuous interaction. And allowing the bailiff to supervise replaying the
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recordings ensured that the jury would not hear portions of Defendant's
voicemail that counsel had successfully excluded.

For these same reasons,

Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's lack of
objection.
IV.

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the victim's one-paragraph witness statement (1) under the rule of
completeness found in rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence; and (2) as a prior
consistent statement under rule 801 (d)(l )(B), Utah Rules of Evidence, as
interpreted in State v. Bujan. The trial court properly admitted the statement
under rule 106. That rule allows for admitting the parts of a written statement
that, in fairness, are required to explain previously referred to portions.
During cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly referred to
Barbara's witness statement to show that it did not contain some of the details
in her testimony. This tactic called into question Barbara's ability to accurately

report the event. It also suggested that Barbara was embellishing her testimony
because her witness statement alone did not fully support Defendant's charges.
The trial court therefore acted well within its discretion in finding that fairness
required that the jury see the entire witness statement. This allowed the jury to
gauge her ability to accurately report the events.
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It also allowed them to

determine whether the statement alone contained sufficient detail to support
Defendant's charges.
But even if the statement were erroneously admitted under rule 106, any
error was harmless. Barbara testified to almost all of the details in her written
statement and Defendant corroborated most of Barbara's testimony. Moreover,
Defendant's basis for arguing that Barbara fabricated here statement was weak
because she stood to gain nothing by doing so.

His conviction would not

relieve her of any debt she owed him under the divorce decree.
Defendant did not preserve his argument that the statement was
inadmissible under rule 801(d)(1)(B) as interpreted in State v. Bujan. Defendant
argues that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte raising, and that his
counsel was ineffective for not making, this argument. But even assuming that
Defendant could show obvious error or deficient performance, he cannot show
the required prejudice under either theory because the witness statement was
independently admissible under rule 106, and even if it was not, any error in
admitting it under that rule was harmless.
V. Defendant argues that the cumulative error doctrine entitles him to
relief.

But because no error occurred, or at most only one harmless error

occurred, that doctrine is inapplicable.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY
THAT TO COMMIT A BURGLARY BASED ON INTENT TO
COMMIT A THEFT, DEFENDANT HAD TO INTEND TO
PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE THE VICTIM OF HER PROPERTY

Defendant argues that the jury instructions on burglary were "inadequate
and misleading" because they did not explain that "burglary by theft requires
proof that the defendant entered/remained with the purpose to permanently
deprive" another of her property. Br.Aplt. 10, 13 (holding and capitalization
omitted). According to Defendant, the instructions suggested that "the intent to
temporarily deprive was sufficient to convict."

Br.Aplt. 13.

Although

Instruction 32 recited verbatim the statutory definition of "purpose to deprive,"
R280, Defendant argues that this definition was "insufficient" because it was an
"abstract definition" that did not explain that this was the "critical element"
that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Br.Aplt. 15.
The instructions correctly explained the law. Contrary to Defendant's
argument, if the jury had believed his version of events, the instructions
prohibited them from convicting him of burglary.
This Court reviews jury instructions uin their entirety and will affirm
when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case."

State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,r148, 299 P.3d 892
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(quotation and citation omitted). "Instructions should be read in their entire
context and given meaning in accordance with the ordinary and usual import of
the language as it would be understood by lay jurors." State v. Kennedy, 2015
UT App 152, if 28, 354 P.3d 775 (quotation and citation omitted).
A. The jury instructions correctly explained the elements of
burglary.

Before the jury could convict Defendant of burglary based on an intent to
commit a theft, the instructions required it to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intended to permanently deprive Barbara of her cellphone. They also
required the jury to find that Defendant possessed that intent when he either
entered or remained unlawfully in her home.
Instruction 28 listed the elements of burglary. R276 (Addendum B is a
copy of the relevant instructions). It told the jury that it could not convict
unless it found "beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant KEN JOHNSON;
2. Knowingly, intentionally or recklessly;

I~

3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another; and
4. With the specific intent to commit:
a. A theft; or
b. An assault on any person.
R276.

Thus, to convict based on an intent to commit theft, Instruction 28

required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had the
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"specific intent" to commit theft when he entered or remained unlawfully in
Barbara's home. 2 R276.
Instruction 32 defined the elements of theft. R280. It explained that to
commit theft, one must obtain or exercise "unauthorized control over the
property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof." R280. Instruction
32 then quoted the statutory definition of "Purpose to deprive," which includes
having "the conscious object: (a) To withhold property permanently or for so
extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion
of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost." 3 R280.

2

Instruction 31 reiterated that "a person commits Burglary if that person
enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with
intent to commit a felony or theft or to commit an assault on any person." R279.
As the trial court read the instructions to the jury, it explained that the jury
could "cross ... off" the words "a felony" because that "isn't the situation here
... in this case we're talking about theft or assault." R348:70-71. The striking
out of the word "commit" and the failure to strike out the following "or"
therefore appears to be a slip of the pen.
3

This part of Instruction 32 stated in its entirety: "'Purpose to deprive'
means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost.
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) to dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it."
R280 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401(3) (West 2015)).
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Read together, these instructions explained that the jury could convict
Defendant of a burglary based on the intent to commit theft only if it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to "withhold [Barbara's] property
permanently."

R280 (Instruction 32).

By explicitly defining "purpose to

deprive" to require this mental state, Instruction 32 alerted the jury that this
was a "critical element" of theft, which in turn became a "critical element" of
...)

.

•

burglary under Instruction 28. R276,280.
The instructions also explained that the jury had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant formed the intent to permanently deprive
when he "[e]ntered or remained unlawfully" in Barbara's home.
(Instruction 28).

R276

As Defendant concedes, "Instruction 28 correctly told the

jury that burglary required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant
entered/remained with the 'specific intent to commit a theft."' Br.Aplt. 15. If
the jury therefore believed Defendant's testimony that he took Barbara's
cellphone only because he intended to keep her from calling the police, and that
he intended to return it to her shortly thereafter, the instructions prohibited the
jury from finding that Defendant entered or remained in Barbara's home with
the intent to commit theft.

And if the jury could not find that Defendant

intended to commit theft, then the instructions also prohibited the jury from
convicting Defendant of burglary based on that theory. As defense counsel
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argued, the "key facts" were Defendant's "mental intent ... when he entered the
place and what his mental intent was when he was in the place." R348:87.
Defendant suggests that an instruction that quotes the statutory language
is insufficient because it provides only an "abstract definition." Br.A pit. 15. But
quoting the statutory definition of a legal term is a perfectly acceptable way to
instruct the jury.

See State v. Clark, 2014 UT App 56, if52, 322 P.3d 761

(accomplice liability instruction that "copied nearly verbatim" from statute
"adequately instructed" jury); State v. Augustine, 2013 UT App 61, iflO, 298 P.3d
693 (accomplice liability instruction that quoted statute verbatim was adequate).
When the jury must understand the meaning of a statutory term like "purpose
to deprive," and the statute defines that term, the trial court cannot be faulted
for concluding that the most accurate way to explain the term is to quote the
statutory definition.
Defendant also argues that the instructions were unclear because they did
not "distinguish between the general and specific intent requirements."
Br.Aplt. 15.

In support, Defendant cites Instruction 25, which generally

explained that one acts "intentionally" when it is his "conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." Br.Aplt. 15; R273. Isolating
this language, Defendant argues that it "might have led the jury to believe that
'intent to commit theft' could be satisfied by mere proof of the intent to
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unlawfully take" Barbara's cellphone, not the intent to keep it permanently.
Br.Aplt. 15.
But jury instructions must be read as a whole and as they would be
understood by lay jurors. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, if 28.

Even though

Instruction 24 defined the mental state of "intentionally" in general terms,
Instruction 28- the burglary elements instruction - unambiguously required
the jury to find that Defendant acted with "the specific intent to commit ... [a]
theft."

R276 (emphasis added).

A lay juror would have understood this

language to require that it could find Defendant guilty of burglary only if it first
found that he intended to commit theft, which, as explained, required that he
intend to permanently take Barbara's phone. R276,280.
Defendant argues that Instruction 33, defining wrongful appropriation,
"suggested that intent to temporarily deprive was sufficient to sustain a
conviction." Br.Aplt. 17. Defendant argues that Instruction 33 was confusing
because it did not tell the jury that intent to temporarily deprive was
insufficient to establish burglary. Br.Aplt. 18.
But it was at defense counsel's request that the trial court instructed the
jury on the elements of wrongful appropriation, which requires only a
temporary taking of another's property. R348:51-53. Instruction 33 explained
that a wrongful appropriation occurs when one takes another's property
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without consent "and with intent to temporarily appropriate, possess, or use
the property or to temporarily deprive the owner or legal custodian of
possession of the property." R281.
Counsel also requested that this instruction include a lengthy
commentary explaining Defendant's "theory of the case" and reiterating that if
the jury found that he intended to keep Barbara's cellphone only temporarily,
then he could not be guilty of theft-or a burglary based on an intent to commit
theft-because an "intention to temporarily deprive the person of the property
is not sufficient to support a burglary charge." R348:51-53;R360-61.
The trial court granted counsel's request to instruct the jury on the
elements of wrongful appropriation, but declined to include the requested
commentary explaining Defendant's "theory of the case."

R348:51-53.

The

court stated that counsel would "have to make [his] own arguments" to the jury
about how the elements of theft and wrongful appropriation applied to the
facts. R348:52-53. After the trial court refused to include counsel's requested
commentary, counsel did not ask to withdraw the instruction. R348:52-53.
Defendant argues that Instruction 33 should have told the jury that intent
to temporarily deprive was insufficient to establish burglary. Br.Aplt. 17-18.
But as explained, Instruction 32 already told the jury that. R280. A trial court
does not err in refusing to give a proposed instruction "if the point is properly
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covered in other instructions." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ~148, 299 P.3d 892;

see also State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) ("It is not error to refuse a
proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions.").
Although a "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense's
theory of the case," he "is not entitled to further instruction" on his theory
"when the other instructions already fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to that theory." Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ,32. "Jury instructions require
no particular form so long as they accurately convey the law." State v. Maama,
2015 UT App 235, ,29, 795 Utah Adv. Rep. 24. Thus, a defendant "is not
entitled to have the jury instructed with any particular wording."

State v.

Marchet, 2012 UT App 197, ifl7, 284 P.3d 668. Because Instruction 32 already
explained that intent to temporarily deprive was insufficient, the court was not
required to repeat that concept in other instructions. 4

4

Defendant does not argue that his counsel was ineffective for proposing
the wrongful appropriation instruction, or for not asking to withdraw it after
the court refused to give his entire proposed instruction. But even if Defendant
had made that argument, he could not prove that his counsel performed
deficiently because his counsel had a legitimate strategic reason for requesting
the instruction. As the trial court recognized, counsel wanted the jury to
understand that an intent to temporarily deprive amounted only to wrongful
appropriation, "so he can claim that was the intent he performed while he was
inside rather than" the intent to commit a theft. R348:51. As counsel argued in
closing, as Defendant left Barbara's home, "he never intended to permanently
keep [her] phone]." R348:90,94.
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B.

The trial court did not give misleading responses to the jury's
questions.

Defendant argues that the trial court gave misleading responses to two
questions that the jury posed during deliberations.

Br.Aplt. 16-17, 18.

During deliberations, the jury asked two questions.

R249,251

(Addendum C is a copy of the questions with the court's answers). The first
asked:
We have a question regarding intent. p.#28-4.
Does the person need to have intent before they
enter the home to commit[t] theft OR can intent
happen after they are in the home?

R249. The trial court responded:
See instruction #31[.] Intent can be formed before
entry or while remaining in the home.
R249. 5
The second question asked:
Jury is confused about the reason for the addition
of p.33[.]
Is there a specific reason it is included?
/:,'l

vJp

5

As explained, Instruction 31 stated, "a person commits Burglary if that
person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling
with intent to commit a felony or theft or to commit and assault on any person."
R249.
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R251. The trial court responded:
Use your collective memory of counsels[']
argument/ and testimony to determine its
significance.
See Instruction #11.
R251. Instruction 11 explained that all of the jury instructions were important,
that the jury should consider them as a whole, and that whether "any particular
instruction applies may depend upon what you decide are the true facts of the
case." R259.
After the jury reached its verdict, but before bringing the jury into the
courtroom, the court explained to counsel that the jury had asked two questions
and that the court had answered them as stated above. R348:100-02. Defense
counsel objected only to the court's answer about the significance of Instruction
33 on wrongful appropriation. R348:100-02. He argued that in addition to the
answer the court gave, it should have added that Defendant's "theory of the
case is that he only wanted to temporarily deprive."

R348:102. The court

overruled the objection. R348:102.
1. Defendant did not preserve his challenge to the court's answer
regarding when he had to form the required mental state, and
he has not shown plain error or ineffective assistance.

Defendant argues that the court's answer to the jury's first question
misled them about when he was required to form the specific intent necessary
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for burglary. Br.Aplt. 16-17. He acknowledges that Instruction 28 explained
that "the entering/remaining had to be 'with' 'the specific intent to commit
theft."' Br.Aplt. 16 (quoting R276). But he argues that the court's response that
intent "can be formed before entry or while remaining in the home" "suggested
that intent could be formed after leaving the home," because the court used the
non-mandatory term "can," instead of "must." Br.Aplt. 16-17.
Defendant did not preserve this argument. To "preserve an issue for
appeal, a defendant must raise the issue before the district court in such a way
that the court is placed on notice of potential error and then has the opportunity
to correct or avoid the error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, ,r10, 189
P.3d 85 (emphasis added). This generally requires a party to make "a timely
and specific objection" in the trial court. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,I17, 192 P.3d
867 (quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

An appellate

argument is not preserved unless the objection below was based on the same
grounds as the appellate argument. See id.
Defendant did not object to the trial court's answer to the jury's first
question. R348:100-02. He therefore did not preserve his appellate challenge to
that answer.
Defendant argues broadly that if "any aspect" of his appellate argument
is unpreserved, then his counsel was ineffective for not making the argument
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and the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte recognizing it. Br.Aplt. 2427. "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (1) the trial
court committed error, (2) the error should have been obvious to the court, and
(3) the error prejudiced the defendant." State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 354
P.3d 791.
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must prove both
that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced him. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, if27, 194 P.3d 913 (citing Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel performs deficiently only
when his performance is objectively unreasonable.

Id. if 28.

Deficient

performance is prejudicial only when there is "'a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). The plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel standards "share a common standard of
prejudice." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, if 42, 302 P.3d 844.
Defendant cannot show any error, let alone obvious, prejudicial error
because the court's answer did not mislead the jury. The jury's question shows
that it was not considering whether it could find Defendant guilty if he formed
the mental state only after leaving the home. Rather, its concern was whether
he had to possess the mental state "before" entering. R249. Nothing in the
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jury's question suggested any confusion about whether Defendant could form
the required mental state after leaving the home. There was therefore no reason
for the trial court to address this non-existent concern, or for counsel to insist
that the trial court do so.
Moreover, as Defendant acknowledges, Instruction 28 informed the jury
that the required mental state had to exist contemporaneously with either the
entering or the remaining. Br.Aplt. 16; R276. Instruction 31 reinforced this fact.
R279. When the lay jurors read these instructions together with the trial court's
answer, they would not have understood the answer to allow them to find
Defendant guilty if he did not form the specific intent to commit theft until after
he left Barbara's home. Thus, there was nothing misleading about the trial
court's answer. And even if there were, any error was neither obvious, nor
prejudicial. Defendant therefore cannot show either that the trial court plainly
erred, or that his counsel was ineffective, in addressing the jury's first question.
2. The trial court correctly responded to the jury's question about
the significance of Instruction 33 on wrongful appropriation.

Defendant also argues that the trial court gave a "problematic" response
to the jury's question about Instruction 33 on wrongful appropriation. Br.Aplt.
18. Rather than merely telling the jury to decide the significance of Instruction
33 for themselves, Defendant argues that the court should have also responded
"that the intent to temporarily deprive was insufficient to support a
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conviction." Br.Aplt. 18. But the court had already explained that principle to
the jury in Instruction 32, which defined the "purpose to deprive" element of
theft. R280. The trial court was not required to reiterate that point. See Maestas,
2012 UT 46, ,I148. The trial court's answer was therefore not misleading.
In sum, the instructions correctly explained the elements of burglary and
the trial court's answers to the jury's questions did not confuse that explanation.
Defendant therefore cannot show error in the jury instructions.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WELL WITHIN ITS DISCRETION
IN ADMITTING A 41-SECOND CLIP OF A VOICEMAIL IN
WHICH DEFENDANT ADMITTED TO BREAKING INTO THE
VICTIM'S HOME

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion under rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence, "by admitting an unfairly prejudicial recording" of a
voicemail that Defendant left on Barbara's phone in which he admitted to
breaking into her home. Br.Aplt. 27. Defendant argues that the brief recording
"was substantially more prejudicial than probative" because Defendant twice
used the £-word and "exhibited extreme animosity" towards Barbara. Br.Aplt.
27, 28-29.
At trial, the prosecutor moved to admit an almost-four-minute voicemail
that Defendant left on Barbara's phone about a week after the burglary.
R347:1,107,113-15; State's Exhibit (SE) #5 (audio CD). Much of the recording is
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L

unintelligible, but the intelligible portions include Defendant's admission that
he broke into Barbara's home. SE#S at 9:27-9:30. Counsel conceded that the
prosecution could play the four seconds of the voicemail in which Defendant
admitted to breaking into Barbara's home. R347:109. But counsel objected that
the entire recording was unfairly prejudicial because it contained obscenities
and "vindictive" statements.

R347:109.

Instead of playing the voicemail,

counsel offered to stipulate that Defendant kicked in Barbara's door and
forcibly entered her home. R347:108-110.
When the prosecutor insisted on playing the voicemail, the trial court
ruled that it would "allow the part where he discusses coming into the house"
but would not allow the jury to hear the entire voicemail. R347:110. When the
prosecutor explained that it would be difficult to cue the recording at that exact
point, the court allowed the prosecutor to "start at the beginning," noting that
much of the initial statements were "hard to understand." R347:111.
The jury heard the first 41 seconds of the voicemail (from 9:30 to 10:11 on
the CD). R347:114-15; SE#S. Although Defendant is difficult to understand, he
can be heard saying, "there's nothing I owe you," "you' re fucking me," and
"they can arrest me for breaking and entering ... whatever the fuck they think
... for you stealing my house from me." SE#S at 9:30-10:11.
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At a later sidebar, defense counsel moved for a mistrial "because the
prosecutor didn't play just the four seconds of 'I entered the place'" but allowed
the jury to hear Defendant using the £-word. R347:137,145-46. The trial court
refused to grant a mistrial merely "because the £-word might have been heard
along with [Defendant's] statements about kicking the door in." R347:146-47.
A trial court may exclude evidence under rule 403 "if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid.
403.

"[U]nfair prejudice results only where the evidence has an undue

tendency to suggest decision upon an improper basis." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT
15, 132, 328 P.3d 841 (quotation and citation omitted). ''Given this bar," Utah
courts "indulge a presumption in favor of admissibility." Id. (quotation and
citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the trial court should have excluded the voicemail
under rule 403 because it "was substantially more prejudicial than probative."
Br.Aplt. 27. Defendant argues that "the probative value of the voicemail was
low" because he later testified and admitted breaking into the home, and
because he had earlier agreed to stipulate that he broke into the home. Br.Aplt.
29. Defendant argues that the danger for unfair prejudice was high because
Defendant used the £-word twice and "exhibited extreme animosity" towards
Barbara. Br.Aplt. 27, 28-29.
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The trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the brief
recording. First, the recording had substantial probative value. Evidence is
II

relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401(a). The recording was
relevant here because it allowed the jury to hear Defendant admit that he broke
into Barbara's home. This was a key element of the burglary charge. See Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-202.
The recording also allowed the jury to get a sense of Defendant's
animosity towards Barbara. The fact that Defendant was still hostile towards
Barbara a week after the burglary made it more likely that he had entered or
remained in her home with the intent to assault or to steal from her.
The brief part of the recording preceding Defendant's admission was also
relevant to put that admission in context. See State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5,
II

if 22, 318 P.3d 1151 (holding that other acts evidence may be admissible under
rule 404(b) to show context").

The prosecution has "the right to present

evidence with broad 'narrative value' beyond the establishment of particular
elements of a crime." State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, if28, 296 P.3d 673.
F.'i
v:,;,

Defendant's later testimony that he broke into Barbara's home did not
decrease the probative value of the recording. When the prosecutor offered the
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recording during his case-in-chief, there was no guarantee that Defendant
would take the stand and admit to breaking into Barbara's home.
Nor did Defendant's offer to stipulate negate the recording's probative
value. The "prosecution retains wide discretion to reject such an offer." Verde,
2012 UT 60, 128. This is because '"a naked proposition in a courtroom may be
no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it."' Id. (quoting

Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997)). A "prosecutor may not be
compelled to accept a stipulation as to an element of a crime since a colorless
admission by the opponent may sometimes have the effect of depriving the
party of the legitimate moral force of his evidence." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452,
455 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citations omitted).
The substantial probative value of Defendant's voicemail was not
"substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid.
403. Defendant's use of the £-word twice did not have "an undue tendency to
suggest decision upon an improper basis," Lucero, 2014 UT 15, iJ32, because that
word has "lost much of [its] shock value in contemporary culture," State v.

Alzaga, 2015 UT App 133, if 51, 352 P.3d 107. In Alzaga, for example, this Court
affirmed the admission of the defendant's recorded statement in which he
employed a variety of profanity, including using the £-word five times in just
two sentences. Id. ~iJ44, 51. This Court held that these "words alone were
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unlikely to induce the jury to return a conviction based on a generalized
assessment of character." Id. 151 (quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant relies on State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), to support
his argument. But Maurer bears no resemblance to this case.
There, the trial court admitted Maurer' s entire letter taunting his murdervictim's father. See 770 P.2d at 982. Maurer's letter proclaimed his satisfaction
in killing his victim-his ex-fiance-boasting that it was "a great feeling to
watch her die," that she kept saying, "It hurts, it hurts," that he hoped so
II

because he used a 13-inch kitchen knife," and that her new boyfriend "got to
watch her die too. It was great." Id. Maurer also denigrated his victim as
"nothing but a fucking whore," who drifted "from one man to another." Id. He
declared his hope that the victim's death

11

hurt" her father, and Maurer

concluded with, the "laugh[']s on you." Id.
Defendant's voicemail clip bears no resemblance to Maurer's letter. As
II

this Court observed in Alzaga, Maurer wrote his letter to inflict additional
emotional pain upon the victim's father."

2015 UT App 133.

Defendant's

voicemail lacked that characteristic and, at worst, evidenced only his frustration
with his ex-wife. And whereas Maurer' s feelings towards his victim's father
were irrelevant, Defendant's feelings toward Barbara were relevant to his state
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of mind when he broke into her home.

Defendant's reliance on Maurer is

therefore misplaced.
In sum, the 41-second voicemail clip was highly probative and contained
·..,:/

little, if any, danger for unfair prejudice. The trial court therefore acted well
within its discretion in admitting it. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 35.
III.
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT HIS COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR AGREEING TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
AND BAILIFF'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE JURY

Defendant argues that the trial judge and bailiff had improper contact
with the jury. Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant first complains that, without counsel or
Defendant present, the trial court explained to the jury why a recess had taken
longer than expected.

Br.Aplt. 33.

He also complains that during jury

deliberations, the court directed the bailiff to supervise the replaying of already
admitted recordings. Br.Aplt. 33. Defendant argues that he preserved these
arguments, but that if he did not, the trial court plainly erred or his counsel
provided ineffective assistance.

Br.Aplt. 39-41.

Regardless of whether he

preserved his arguments, Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a presumption
of prejudice that the State cannot rebut on this record. Br.Aplt. 36-41.
Defendant did not preserve either argument. In fact, he invited any error
because his counsel agreed with the court's plans to explain the delay to the
jury and to have the bailiff supervise replaying the recordings. Thus, the only
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issue is whether counsel was ineffective for doing so. Defendant cannot show
that his counsel was, because conceivable tactical reasons support counsel's
decisions. And because Defendant did not preserve his arguments, he is not
entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Rather, he must demonstrate prejudice,
which he cannot do.
A. Defendant invited any error because his counsel agreed to the
interactions.
1.

Background.

After the defense rested, the trial court announced a ten-minute recess.
R348:49.

The jury left the courtroom and counsel and the court discussed

whether the prosecutor would introduce rebuttal evidence.

R348:49-50.

Defense counsel asked what witnesses the prosecutor would be calling.
R348:50. When the prosecutor said that he was not sure, the court gave the
prosecutor "10 or 15 minutes to decide." R348:50.
When the court reconvened, still out of the jury's presence, the prosecutor
said that he would not introduce any rebuttal evidence.

R348:50-51.

The

parties then discussed several necessary modifications to the jury instructions
and verdict forms. R348:51-55.
As that discussion ended, the court told counsel that it intended to go to
the jury room and explain why the recess had taken longer than planned.
R348:55. The court specifically stated:
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Okay. We need time to do all those things. I'm going to tell the
jury that we're working on all this, that there's no rebuttal. That
we' re going to be copying jury instructions so it may take a few
minutes more than 15 so they don't blame it on you.
R348:55. Defense counsel responded, "Okay." R348:55 (Addendum D contains
the discussion regarding the jury contacts).
When the court and counsel reconvened, still out the jury's presence, the
court made of record of what it had told the jury about the delay. R348:55-56.
The court added that the jury had asked whether it would be able to listen to
the recordings of Defendant's voicemail and Barbara's 911 call, which had been
admitted into evidence. R348:55-56. The court stated:
Ummm, we got the jury instructions copied. The-I went in and
told the jury that it had been longer than a 15-break [sic] because
we were copying all the jury instructions and putting in the ones
that you had all brought this morning that I had given you the
opportunity to bring and the State was deciding whether to do
rebuttal and all that and they said, Well, when we get this case are
we going to be able to listen to the tapes? Is there a transcript of
the tapes? So I said there's no transcripts of the tapes, we will
discuss whether you get to hear the tapes.
R348:55-56. The court said that it was inclined to allow the jury to hear the
recordings because "they are admitted into evidence."

R348:56. The court

suggested that both counsel could go into the jury room while the voicemail
clip was played to ensure that the jury heard only the admitted portion.
R348:56.
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Defense counsel objected, but not to the court's contact with the jury.
R348:56 (Add. D). Rather, he objected only to the jury hearing the recordings

C,

\l!i;I

again because in his view, the recordings had not actually been admitted into
evidence. R348:56. Counsel also objected to the court having both counsel go
into the jury room during deliberations to replay the recordings. R348:56. The
court decided that it would allow the jury to hear the recordings. R348:58.
The court then instructed the jury, counsel made their closing arguments,
and the jury retired for deliberations. R348:58-99. Apparently taking part of
defense counsel's earlier objection to heart, the court suggested having "the
prosecutor show the bailiff how to play those things, probably just the bailiff
will go in." R348:99. Defense counsel did not object. R348:99-106. Rather, he

G

asked only "to be present when [the prosecutor] gives the instructions to the
bailiff." R348:100 (Add. D).
2. Defendant invited any error.

Defendant argues that his counsel preserved both of his appellate
challenges because his counsel objected after the judge reported her off-therecord contact with the jury and again objected II to the juror-bailiff contact."
Br.Aplt. 39. But neither objection preserved the arguments that Defendant now
raises on appeal, because counsel never objected to either jury contact; rather,
counsel actually invited any error because he agreed to those contacts.
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Counsel did object after the court made a record of how it explained the
delay to the jury, but counsel did not object to the court's doing so. R348:56.
Rather, counsel objected only to the court's decision to replay the recordings for
the jury and to allow both counsel to supervise that process. R348:56. Neither
objection asserted that the court should not have explained the reasons for the
delay to the jury.
Defendant suggests that his counsel had no notice that the court would
speak with the jury off-the-record. Br.Aplt. 33. He asserts that the judge did so
"without notice to or in the presence of counsel."

Br.Aplt. 33.

Defendant

misstates the record.
Defense counsel not only knew of the court's plan to explain the delay to
the jury off-the-record, but he actually agreed to that plan. When the court told
counsel that it was "going to tell the jury that we're working on all this, that
there's no rebuttal" and that "we' re going to be copying jury instructions so it
may take a few minutes more than the 15," counsel responded, "Okay."
R348:55. Counsel therefore endorsed the court's plan to explain the delay to the
jury.
Operating under the misconception that his counsel objected to the
court's off-the-record contact with the jury, Defendant argues that any "further
objection" would have been futile because the judge had already engaged in the
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contact. Br.Aplt. 39. But if counsel believed that the interaction was improper,
he could have preserved the issue by moving for a mish~ial, or for a new trial,
after the contact happened. See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 907 (Utah App. 1990)
(mistrial motion after learning of jury contact preserved issue of improper jury
contact); State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985) (motion for new trial
preserved issue of improper jury contact). Counsel did not do so. R348:55-106.
Defendant therefore did not preserve his appellate challenge to the court-jury
contact. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17, 192 P.3d 867.
Nor did Defendant preserve his appellate challenge to the bailiff-jury
contact. Rather, defense counsel implicitly endorsed that contact. Br.Aplt. 39.
Defense counsel objected after the court suggested that both counsel supervise
replaying the recordings during deliberations. R348:56-58. But again, the bases
for that objection were that (1) the jury should not be able to hear the recordings
again; and (2) it would be improper to have counsel in the jury room. R348:5658.
When the court suggested having the bailiff supervise the replaying,
defense counsel did not object. R348:99-100. Rather, he implicitly endorsed that
c~
\illi1

plan and asked to be present when the prosecutor instructed the bailiff on how
to replay the recordings. R348:100.
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Because his counsel endorsed both of the jury contacts that Defendant
now complains of, Defendant invited any error. A party invites error when
"counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the trial court
that he or she had no objection to the proceedings." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
114, 128 P.3d 1171 (quotation and citation omitted).

As explained, defense

counsel endorsed both the trial court- and bailiff-jury interactions. Defendant
therefore invited any error arising from those interactions. See id.
B.

The invited error doctrine precludes any plain error review.

Defendant argues that if he did not preserve his arguments, this Court
should nevertheless review them for plain error. Br.Aplt. 39-41. But "invited
error precludes appellate review of an issue under the plain error standard."

State v. Lee, 2014 UT App 4, ,r20, 318 P.3d 1164. Thus, this Court may review
this issue only to determine whether Defendant's counsel was ineffective for
not objecting to the jury contacts.
C.

Defendant cannot show that his counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the jury interactions.

Defendant argues in three sentences that his counsel was ineffective for
not objecting to the jury contacts. Br.Aplt. 41. Defendant cannot satisfy either
element of the ineffective assistance analysis.
As explained, to prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must
prove both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
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performance prejudiced him.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984).

1.

Defendant cannot show deficient performance because his
counsel had sound tactical reasons for not objecting.

Defendant cannot show deficient performance because conceivable
tactical bases explain why he would agree to allowing the judge to explain the
delay to the jury and to having the bailiff supervise replaying the recordings.
This Court's review of counsel's performance begins with "a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This presumption exists because of the "variety of
circumstances faced by defense counsel" and "the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant." State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d
1250, 1254 (Utah 1993); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The presumption
recognizes that, "[u]nlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the
relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with
the client, with opposing counsel, and with the judge." Harrington v. Richter,
131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
To rebut the strong presumption of reasonable performance, Defendant
must "persuad[e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,
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,r 6,

89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in

original) (quotations and citation omitted); Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, if19,
165 P.3d 1195 (holding that the "defendant" must "overcome the presumption"
of competent representation"). "If a rational basis for counsel's performance
can be articulated, [this Court] will assume counsel acted competently." State v.

Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, any conceivable tactical
basis for trial counsel's actions defeats a claim of deficient performance. See

Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, 158, 61
P.3d 291.
Conceivable tactical bases explain counsel's decision not to object. First,
counsel could have reasonably concluded that allowing the court to explain the
reasons for the delay to the jury would reduce the likelihood that the jury
would become irritated or frustrated with the proceedings, or even with
counsel, especially immediately before closing argument.

Second, counsel

could have reasonably concluded that having the bailiff supervise replaying the
recordings would eliminate the risk that the jury would hear portions of
Defendant's voicemail that counsel had successfully argued to keep the jury
from hearing.
Counsel could have also reasonably concluded that both the court's and
the bailiff's interactions with the jury were innocuous.

A judge's brief

communication with the jury to address scheduling matters is not presumed to
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be prejudicial. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if if 68-70, 299 P.3d 892. Indeed,
"'[t]here is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do not have
occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a
matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial."' Id. if 69 (quoting

Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 115 (1983)).
Defendant argues that the "judge's off-the-record conversation with the
jury involved 'substantive matters,' not mere trial logistics."
(quoting Maestas, 2012 UT 46, if70).

Br.Aplt. 36

Defendant asserts that the judge discussed

with the jury whether the prosecution would introduce rebuttal evidence.
Br.Aplt. 36. He further argues that the judge's use of the phrase, "'and all
that,"' shows that she engaged the jury in "a detailed off-the-record
conversation about matters directly related to trial." Br.Aplt. 36.
The record does not support Defendant's reading. Rather, it shows that
the court merely reported the reasons that the recess was taking longer than
announced, which included finalizing the jury instructions and the prosecutor's
decision about rebuttal.

R348:55-56.

When the jury raised a substantive

matter- whether they would receive transcripts of Defendant's voicemail and
Barbara's 911 call, or whether they could hear those recordings again-the court
expressly declined to answer that question without first consulting counsel.
R348:56.
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Defendant's speculation about what the judge meant by the phrase "and
all that" does not establish that the judge discussed substantive matters with the
jury. The most reasonable interpretation of the judge's colloquialism is that she
was merely referring to the various factors she had already mentioned as
contributing to the delay.
Defendant argues that the discussion might have created a sense of
familiarity with the judge. Br.Aplt. 36. But as Maestas recognized, the jury
would not have considered it unusual for the judge to explain scheduling
matters. See 2012 UT 46, ifif 69-71. Indeed, "it seems unlikely that jurors would
feel any differently toward the judge than if" she had explained the reasons for
the delay "with counsel and [Defendant] present." Id. if71. And because "the
judge was not an adversary ... it would not have been problematic if jurors felt
appreciative toward the judge after" she explained the reasons for the delay. Id.
For all these reasons, counsel could have reasonably concluded that there was
nothing improper about the court's interaction with the jury, and therefore no
reason to object.
Defendant argues that the bailiff's contact was improper because he "was
present while the jury actually deliberated."

Br.Aplt. 38.

To support this

proposition, Defendant cites United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 138-39 (4th Cir.
2003), where the Fourth Circuit held that no error occurred when a bailiff "cued
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up the audiotape to the designated spot" and then left. Br.Aplt. 38. The Fourth
Circuit distinguished that circumstance from the one in United States v. Freeman,
634 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1980), where the Tenth Circuit held that reversible
error occurred after a "technician" played a tape to a jury during deliberations,
because "the technician [was] present during actual deliberations." Pratt, 351
F.3d at 139.

But the Tenth Circuit held that the Freeman procedure was

prejudicial because the "technician" who played the recording during
deliberations was an FBI agent who was "the chief government investigator in
the case" and who had testified for the government during the trial. 634 F.2d at
1268-69.
That did not happen here. The bailiff was not a witness, nor was he
associated with either party. Thus, the events here more closely resemble the
innocuous bailiff-juror contact in State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 907-10 (Utah App.
1990).
In Jonas, a juror was excused mid-trial because of a family emergency and
asked the bailiff to explain his absence to the other jurors, which the bailiff did
off the record. Id. at 907-08. This Court held that this bailiff-jury contact was
innocuous because there was no discussion between the bailiff and the jury
about the dismissed juror, the bailiff had not been a witness, he did not
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interrupt the jury's deliberations, and the bailiff's report concerned something
tangential to the trial. Id. at 909-10.
While the bailiff's contact here did occur during deliberations, that fact
,-ii)

alone does not make the contact prejudicial. There is no evidence that the bailiff
did anything other than replay the already admitted portions of the recordings
to the jury. There is no evidence that any deliberating happened while the
bailiff did so. And the bailiff's presence was necessary to ensure that the jury
heard only the portion of the Defendant's voicemail that had been admitted.
Thus the jury would have viewed the bailiff's presence during deliberations as
routine and necessary. Bailiff-jury contact is "expected and unavoidable since
the bailiff is assigned to minister to the jurors' needs and to be the contact
person." Jonas, 793 P .2d at 909.
Because these reasons establish conceivable tactical bases for not
objecting to the jury contacts, Defendant has not rebutted the presumption that
his counsel's performance was objectively reasonable.
2.

Defendant cannot show prejudice because the contacts were
innocuous.

Nor can Defendant show prejudice. Defendant argues that he is entitled
to a presumption of prejudice that the State must rebut. Br.Aplt. 40-41. Utah
courts do take "a strict approach" to claims of improper juror contact. State v.
Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985).
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Under this approach, "a rebuttable

presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized contact during a trial
between witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes beyond
a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact." Id.
But this presumption applies only to preserved claims. See Maestas, 2012
UT 46,

,r,rs9, 67-71.

In Maestas, for example, the defendant did not preserve his

claims of improper juror contact.

Id. ,r,r70-71.

The Utah Supreme Court

therefore refused to apply a presumption of prejudice and instead required
Maestas to show that any error was harmful. Id. if 71 ("Without a presumption
of prejudice, Mr. Maestas must show harm in order to prevail on his claim.").
Moreover, because this Court must review this issue under an ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis, Defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice
as a necessary element of his claim.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-87.

A

defendant cannot prove that his counsel was ineffective unless he carries the
burden to prove that his counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial. State

v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 46, 796 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68487). And while prejudice may be presumed for certain ineffective assistance
claims, "this class of error is extremely limited, including, for example, an actual
or constructive denial of the right to counsel or when counsel labors under an
actual conflict of interest."

Id. if 46 n.18 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692).

Defendant's claim does not involve those kinds of presumptively prejudicial

-44-

circumstances. He must therefore prove prejudice. Id. if 46; Maestas, 2012 UT
46, if71.
Defendant cannot do so for the reasons already explained.

The trial

court's brief contact with the jury involved only scheduling- not substantiveissues. The jury would not have seen such interaction as unusual, nor would
the interaction have had the potential to improperly influence the jury.
Additionally, Instruction 15 told the jury that the judge was "neutral," that if
the jury believed that something the judge did indicated favoritism for one side
or the other "that was not [the judge's] intention," and that jurors should "not
interpret anything" the judge said or did as indicating that the judge had "any
particular view of the evidence or the decision you should reach." R263. All of
these factors mitigated any potential for prejudice arising from the judge's
contact with the jury.
Likewise, the jury would not have viewed the bailiff's replaying of
already admitted recordings as unusual, nor would they have been improperly
influenced thereby. There is no record that the bailiff did anything but replay
the recordings for the jury.
prejudice.

For all these reasons, Defendant cannot prove

He therefore cannot establish either element of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.
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IV.
AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL REFERRED TO THE VICTIM'S
WRITTEN
POLICE
STATEMENT
DURING
CROSSEXAMINATION, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
THE ENTIRE STATEMENT UNDER RULE 106, UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Barbara's oneparagraph written witness statement under the rule of completeness found in
rule 106, Utah Rules of Evidence, and as a prior consistent statement under rule
801(d)(l)(B), Utah Rules of Evidence. Br.Aplt. 41-47. Defendant argues that the
entire statement was inadmissible under rule 106 because that rule admits only
those portions of a statement that are '"necessary to rebut the charges of recent
fabrication."' Br.Aplt. 45 (quoting State v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, ,r10, 190 P.3d
1255). Relying on Bujan, Defendant argues that Barbara's written statement was
inadmissible as a prior consistent statement because it was made after she had a
motive to fabricate. Br.Aplt. 42-43.
The trial court properly admitted the statement under rule 106. After
defense counsel repeatedly referred to portions of the statement in crossexamining Barbara, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to find that
fairness required the jury to see the entire statement. Regardless, any error was
harmless where Barbara had already testified to most of the details in her
statement, Defendant's testimony corroborated most of Barbara's testimony,
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and Defendant's assertion that Barbara fabricated the uncorroborated details
was weak.
Defendant did not preserve his Bujan argument.

He argues that his

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the statement, and that the trial
court plainly erred for not sua sponte excluding it, on that basis. But Defendant
cannot prove the prejudice element of either theory because the statement was
independently admissible under rule 106 or, at best, any error in admitting the
statement under that rule was harmless.
A. Background.

The trial court admits, but then withdraws the written police statement
During Barbara's direct examination, the prosecutor moved to admit her
written witness statement.

R347:97 (Addendum E is the discussion on

admitting the witness statement). Defense counsel objected that the statement
was hearsay. R347:97-98. The trial court initially overruled the objection and
admitted the written statement under rule 801(d)(l)(B). R347:98-102. That rule
allows admission of a witness's prior consistent statement that "is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or
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acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying." 6 Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(l)(B).
The trial court allowed the exhibit to be published to the jury.
R347:102,107-08. But the jury did not have the exhibit for long because the trial
court quickly reversed its ruling. R347:106-08,111 (Add. E).
After a recess, the trial court reversed itself because it realized that it had
misread rule 801 as placing no restrictions on admitting a prior consistent
statement. R347:106-08. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the trial
court denied the motion because it did not believe that the jury's having had the
exhibit "for two minutes" required such a drastic remedy. R347:106-07. The
court then explained to the jury that after having re-read the hearsay rule,
defense counsel was "correct" that the written statement was "not admissible
under Rule 801" and that the court "was wrong" to have admitted it. R347:111.
The court explained that it was retracting the exhibit from the jury. R347:111
(Add. E).

6

The transcript has the prosecutor arguing that Barbara's witness
statement was admissible as a prior "inconsistent" statement. R347:98. Later
discussion clarifies, however, that the prosecutor was arguing that the
statement was admissible as a prior "consistent" statement and that the trial
court initially admitted the statement on this ground. R347:100-02,105-06.
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Defense counsel repeatedly refers to portions of
the withdrawn exhibit during cross-examination
While cross-examining Barbara, defense counsel repeatedly asked her
about her police statement. R347:122-23. He first asked her to confirm that she
did not write that Defendant had grabbed her. R347:122-23. When Barbara
replied that she could not remember exactly what she wrote, counsel showed
her a copy of the statement and asked "isn't it true that the word grab,
grabbing, grabbed, none of those words appear in that statement?" R347:123.
Barbara agreed. R347:123. Counsel then emphasized that the detective had
instructed Barbara to "write down what happened" and "tell him everything."
R347:123.
Counsel then asked whether Barbara had written that Defendant had
feinted punches at her face. R347:128-29. Barbara admitted that she did not.
R347:129. Counsel again emphasized that the police had asked Barbara "to tell
them the full details of the incident." R347:129.
Counsel then reiterated that although Barbara had testified at the
preliminary hearing that Defendant had grabbed her wrist, she did not include
that detail in her police statement. R347:131. Counsel emphasized that "the
word wrist doesn't even appear" in the statement. R347:132.
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On redirect, Barbara explained that she did not mention the feinted
punches because she "didn't really think about it or remember it until later."
R347:143.

The trial court readmits the written witness statement
Barbara's testimony concluded and the trial court excused the jury.
R347:145. The trial court ruled that counsel's cross-examination had opened the
door to admitting Barbara's written witness statement because counsel had
"implied" that she had "fabricated at some point." R347:147 (Add. E). The
court thus admitted Barbara's entire police statement as a prior consistent
statement under rule 801(d){l)(B). R347:151.
Defense counsel objected to admitting the entire statement and argued
that only those portions that were consistent with challenged portions of
Barbara's testimony were admissible. R347:148-54. Counsel conceded that two
of Barbara's written statements were admissible: (1) that she "was still trying to
get [her] phone back to call 911"; and (2) that Defendant "said he should just
push [her] down the stairs." R347:153.
The prosecutor responded that the rule of completeness allowed
admission of the entire statement.

R347:154.

Defense counsel disagreed,

arguing that the rule of completeness did not override the hearsay rule.
R347:154.
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The trial court ultimately overruled defense counsel's objections and
admitted Barbara's one-paragraph statement as State's Exhibit 4.

R347:155

(Addendum F is a copy of the statement). The court explained that defense
counsel had "referred too much to the statement" and could not "keep pulling
bits and piece[s] of it out and expect that it's not going to go into evidence."
R347:155,160. The court was also concerned that counsel's cross-examination
had taken "a bunch of stuff out of context." R347:149. The court reasoned that
because counsel had "thrown into question things that [Barbara] did not
include in here ... it only seems fair" to admit the entire statement II to show the
things that she did include." R347:160 (Add. E).
The prosecutor then recalled Barbara and reoffered her witness statement
as an exhibit, which the trial court received. R347:162-63;SE#4. That statement
reads:
My ex[-]husband came to my home drunk[.] I did not want to
answer the door. He started kicking the back door. I grab[b]ed my
phone and was yelling at him to leave[.] He broke the door in[.] I
called 911 and [h]e took my phone and would not give it back[.]
He was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money and I will
not get it back. We got to the front door and I was still trying to get
my phone back to call 911[.] He pushed me and said [h]e should
just push me down the stairs. He got in his truck and I ran to [the]
neighbor[']s [h]ouse[.]
SE #4 (Add. F).
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B.

The witness statement was admissible under rule 106.

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Barbara's
entire witness statement under rule 106, because that rule allows admission of
only "'information necessary to rebut the charges of recent fabrication."'
Br.Aplt. 45 (quoting Bujan, 2008 UT 47, 110). Defendant argues that although
he impeached Barbara's testimony by showing that her witness statement
omitted any mention of him grabbing or feinting punches at her, the statement
was nevertheless inadmissible under rule 106 because it "was not relevant to
rehabilitating Barbara's testimony regarding these claimed inconsistencies."
Br.Aplt. 45. On the contrary, Barbara's entire statement was relevant to dispel
Defendant's notion that she could not accurately report the event and was
embellishing her trial testimony.
Known as the rule of completeness, rule 106 "permits introduction of an
otherwise inadmissible statement if the opposing party introduces a portion of
the statement." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, if40,345 P.3d 1195. The rule provides

r-,

~

that when "a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an
adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part-or
any other writing or recorded statement-that in fairness ought to be
considered at the same time." Utah R. Evid. 106. The rule is designed "to
prevent a 'misleading impression created by taking matters out of context."' Id.

-52-

(quoting State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, if44 n.6, 993 P.2d 232). "The rule
establishes a 'fairness' standard that requires 'admission of those things that are
relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the portion
already introduced."' Id. (quoting State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, 114, 76 P.3d
1165).
Fairness required admission of Barbara's entire witness statement. While
cross-examining Barbara, counsel repeatedly highlighted that while she had
testified that Defendant had grabbed her and feinted punches, she omitted
those details from her written statement, even though she had been instructed
to explain "everything that happened." R347:122-23,128-29,131-32. That line of
questioning suggested that Barbara's entire testimony was unreliable because
she could not accurately report the events. It further suggested that she was
embellishing her testimony with events that did not happen because her
witness statement alone did not fully support Defendant's charges.
To rebut these suggestions, the jury needed to see exactly how Barbara
had described the events in her written statement. Only by reviewing the entire
statement could the jury understand what details of her trial testimony she had
included in her written statement. Comparing Barbara's entire statement with
her testimony thus allowed the jury to fairly assess Barbara's ability to
accurately report the events. Reviewing the entire statement also allowed the
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jury to see that the statement alone contained sufficient detail to support the
charges. This allowed the jury to accurately assess whether the omissions in
Barbara's written statement resulted from her desire to fabricate details
necessary to support the charges, or whether the omissions had an innocent
explanation. Given counsel's cross-examination, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that fairness required the jury to see Barbara's entire
written statement.
This Court reached a similar result in State v. MontgomenJ, 2007 UT App
24U, if4. There, during cross-examination, the defendant's counsel questioned a
detective about a paragraph of his police report. Id. On redirect, the State had
the detective read the first and second paragraphs of his report "to clarify
questions addressed in the cross-examination." Id. This Court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting those portions of the police
report under rule 106, because the defendant "introduced the police report and
the State merely used the report to clarify issues raised by" the defendant. Id.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has likewise explained that
under the rule of completeness: "Counsel cannot be permitted, for the purpose
of impeaching a witness, to introduce extracts of the former testimony of such
witness, and then be heard to complain that the whole of such testimony was
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introduced, and the whole truth given to the jury." Goode v. State, 236 P.3d 671,
678 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant argues in a footnote that rule 106 cannot apply here because
he did not introduce any portion of Barbara's written statement, but rather
referred only to omissions from her statement. Br.Aplt. 46 n.13. But that logic
would frustrate the fairness concerns that rule 106 protects. For that reason, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument in State v.

Patterson, 625 S.E.2d 239, 227-28 (S.C. App. 2006). The Patterson court refused to
construe "Rule 106 in such a way that inquiries that probed at alleged omissions
from a statement would not open the door to the admission of the statement"
because that would frustrate the rule's purpose. Id. at 228. The Patterson court
therefore held that" the rule of completeness applies to insinuations, innuendos,
and omissions." Id.
That reasoning equally applies here. As this Court recognized in Leleae, a
11

trial court has considerable discretion in determining issues of fairness." 1999

UT App 368, if 45. Here, after defense counsel repeatedly highlighted omissions
in Barbara's statement, fairness required that the jury see Barbara's entire
statement to qualify, explain, or place into context" those omissions. See id.
II

(quotation and citation omitted). The trial court therefore acted well within its
discretion in admitting the entire statement under rule 106. See id. if 46.
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C.

Any error was harmless because almost all of the statement's
details were already before the jury, Defendant's testimony
corroborated most of those details, and his argument that the
victim fabricated the uncorroborated details was weak.

In any event, any error in admitting Barbara's one-paragraph witness
statement was harmless because the jury had already heard almost all of the
details in the statement and Defendant's testimony corroborated most of those
details. When erroneously admitted evidence is cumulative or corroborated by
the defendant's own statements, the error is harmless. See State v. Bundy, 684
P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984); see also State v. McClellan, 2009 UT 50, ,I32, 216 P.3d 956
(any error in admitting defendant's recorded police interrogation was harmless
because "[i]dentical evidence was already before the jury in the form of the
testimony of the interviewing officer").
Here, Barbara had already testified to almost all of the details in her
written statement. And Defendant corroborated many of those details when he
testified that he kicked in Barbara's back door, entered her home, took her
phone, and fled. R348:23-25.
The only portion of her statement that Barbara did not testify to was her
statement that Defendant "was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money
and I will not get it back."

SE #4 (Add. F).

Defendant argues that this

statement was prejudicial because the jury "might have relied" on it to find that
Defendant entered or remained in Barbara's home with the intent to
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permanently deprive her of her cellphone. Br.Aplt. 47. But it is not clear that
Barbara was reporting that Defendant said she would not get her phone back.
Rather, the more logical reading of her statement is that Defendant was saying
that Barbara would not get her money back.

The relevant portion of the

statement reads:
I called 911 and [h]e took my phone and would not give it back[.]
He was still yelling at me telling me I owe him money and I will
not get it back.
SE #4 (Add. F). In context, the "it" that Barbara refers to is the "money" that
she mentioned in the same sentence, not the "phone" that she mentioned in the
previous sentence.
But even if Defendant's reading is plausible, he still cannot show
prejudice because he cannot show a reasonable probability that the jury would
have read the statement that same way. To show prejudicial error, Defendant
"must demonstrate that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome." State v. Perea, 213 UT 68, if 97,322 P.3d 624 (quotation
and citation omitted). Because the statement is ambiguous at best, there is no
reasonable probability that the jury seized on it as evidence of Defendant's
intent to commit theft, especially where the prosecutor did not refer to it in his
closing arguments. R348:80-86,95-98.
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Additionally, Defendant's basis for insinuating that Barbara fabricated
this detail was weak. As the trial court recognized, the outcome of this case
could not affect whether Barbara owed Defendant money. R347:130-31. There
was no evidence that Barbara would be relieved of her debt if Defendant were
convicted of a felony. Additionally, Defendant's own testimony demonstrated
that Barbara did not fabricate the event because he corroborated much of her
account.

The only portions of Barbara's statement that Defendant did not

corroborate were her statements: (1) that he yelled at her that she owed him
Q

money and she would not get it back; and (2) that he pushed her and
threatened to push her down the stairs. But Defendant does not offer a viable
reason that Barbara would have fabricated these statements in the short time
between calling police and writing her statement that same day.
Defendant argues that admitting the statement was harmful because the
court "emphasized" it by admitting it, withdrawing it, and then readmitting it.
Br.Aplt. 47-48. On the contrary, if the court's actions suggested anything about
the statement, it was only that an exhibit that the court had improperly
admitted was now admissible because defense counsel had referred to it while
cross-examining Barbara.
Finally, Defendant argues that admitting the witness statement was
prejudicial because the jury must have believed his version of events when it
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Q

acquitted him of making a threat of violence. Br.Aplt. 21, 47. But the jury's split
verdict does not demonstrate that it necessarily believed Defendant. The "most
that can be said in such cases is that the verdict shows that either in the
acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions, but that
does not show that they were not convinced of the defendant's guilt." Dunn v.

United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932) (quotation and citation omitted); see also
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984).
"[I]nconsistent verdicts- even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense
while convicting on the compound offense-should not necessarily be
interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It is
equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its
conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise,
or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense." Powell,
469 U.S. 64-65.

There were several reasons that the jury might acquit Defendant of
making a threat of violence even without believing his story. Barbara gave
inconsistent reports about Defendant's threats. As explained, Barbara did not
include the details about Defendant's threats in her written witness statement,
nor did Barbara tell the 911 operator that Defendant had feinted punches
towards her face.

R347:131;SE#4.

And although Barbara testified that
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Defendant did not try to throw her down the stairs, she told the 911 operator
that Defendant did try to push her down the stairs. R347:127-28. Barbara also
told the 911 operator that she did not want to get Defendant in trouble.
R347:167;SE#6 at 3:11-3:14. Given these inconsistencies, the jury could have
disbelieved Defendant but still found that the prosecution had not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that he threatened her with violence. Thus, the split
verdict does not demonstrate that the jury necessarily believed Defendant.
In sum, Barbara had already testified to almost all of the details in her
witness statement, Defendant corroborated most of those details, and the jury's
verdict does not demonstrate that they necessarily believed Defendant.
Defendant therefore cannot show that any error in admitting the written
statement was harmful. See Perea, 213 UT 68, if 97.
D. Defendant did not preserve his argument that the witness
statement was inadmissible under Bujan and cannot show that
the trial court plainly erred or that his counsel was ineffective.

Defendant did not preserve his argument that Barbara's police statement
was inadmissible under Bujan because he did not make that argument below.

See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, if17, 192 P.3d 867. Rather, counsel conceded that
two parts of Barbara's witness statement were admissible as prior consistent
statements under rule 801(d)(l)(b), even though they were allegedly made after
the alleged motive to fabricate that Defendant now formulates arose. R347:153.

-60-

r-.
vu

If anything, this concession signaled that counsel was not concerned about the
timing of the police statement. Rather, defense counsel's only objection was
that, other than those two statements that were consistent with her trial
testimony, the rest of Barbara's police statement was hearsay and therefore
inadmissible, even under the rule of completeness. R347:97-98,148-54. Because
that was the only basis for Defendant's objection, that was the only argument
that he preserved. See Low, 2008 UT 58, if 17.
Defendant briefs his Bujan challenge as if preserved, but argues in the
closing paragraphs that if he did not preserve the argument, then the trial court
plainly erred and his counsel was ineffective for not raising it. Br.Aplt. 49. As
explained, plain error requires a showing of obvious, prejudicial error. See State

v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 354 P.3d 791. To show that his counsel was
ineffective, Defendant must prove both that his counsel's performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. The plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel standards
"share a common standard of prejudice." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134,

if 42,302 P.3d 844.
Defendant cannot show either plain error or ineffective assistance
because he cannot establish the prejudice element of either theory. Even if
Barbara's statement were inadmissible under rule 801(D)(l)(B), it was
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independently admissible under rule 106 or, at most, any error in admitting it
under that rule was harmless. Therefore, Defendant cannot show that the trail
court plainly erred for not sua sponte excluding Barbara's written statement
under Bujan, or that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
statement on that basis, because he cannot show that any error in admitting the
statement was prejudicial.
V.
THE CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE

Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to relief under the
cumulative error doctrine. Br.Aplt. 50. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict
under the cumulative error doctrine only 'if the cumulative effect of the several
errors undermines ... confidence that a fair trial was had."' State v. Killpack,
2008 UT 49,

,r 58, 191 P.3d 17 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ,r 73, 28 P.3d

1278 (omissions in original)). As demonstrated, Defendant has not shown any
error, or at most, only one harmless error. His cumulative error claim therefore
fails. See id. (rejecting a cumulative error claim where the defendant failed to
demonstrate any error).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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ADDENDUM A

Statutes and Rules

.,

Addendu1n A

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2015). Burglary.
@

(1) An actor is guilty of burglary who enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to commit:

(a) a felony;
(b) theft;

(c) an assault on any person;
(d) lewdness, a violation of Section 76-9-702;

(e) sexual battery, a violation of Section 76-9-702.1;

(f) lewdness involving a child, in violation of Section 76-9-702.5; or
(g) voyeurism under Section 76-9-702. 7.

(2) Burglary is a third degree felony unless it was committed in a dwelling, in
which event it is a second degree felony.
/~

(3) A violation of this section is a separate offense from any of the offenses listed
in Subsections (1)(a) through (g), and which may be committed by the actor

while in the building.
Amended by Chapter 303, 2012 General Session

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-401 (West 2015). Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and
intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written
insb uments or other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real
or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value
to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such as telecommunications,
gas, elechAicity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any
portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure,
formula or invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to
persons selected by him.
4

(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property, whether to
the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to secure performance
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any facsimile, replica,
photograph, or other reproduction.

(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use
under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or
of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that
the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily
limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by
LTespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that
is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously
created or confirmed by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment
of another and that the actor does not now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment
in the transaction; or
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a
lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the
enjoyment of the property, whether the lien, security interest, claim, or
impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) Pro1nises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or
knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the
promise in issue without other evidence of intent or knowledge is not
sufficient proof tl1at the actor did not intend to perform or knew the prornise
would not be performed.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (West 2015). Theft-Elements.
A person com1nits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized conh·ol over

the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session

Utah R. Evid. 106. Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements
;.i)

~

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse
party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part - or any other
writing or recorded statement - that in fairness ought to be considered at the
same time.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim. Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) was not as
specific, but Rule 106 is otherwise in accord with Utah practice.

Utah R. Evid. 403.
Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion,
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as

part of tbe restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them 1nore easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These

changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule
45, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that" surprise" is not included as a basis
for exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of
substance, since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as
contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403
indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate
method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D.
Tex. 1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial
and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect.
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State 1.J. Johns, 615
P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lo/mer, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

Utah R. Evid. 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from
Hearsay

(a) Sta tern en t. "Statement" means a person's oral assertion, written assertion,
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.
(b) Oeclarant. "Declarant" means the person who made the state1nent.

(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" means a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or
hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in
the statement.
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following
conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness's Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is
subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant
denies having made the statem.ent or has forgotten, or

(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut
an express or implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or
acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the d~clarant perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party's Statement. The statement is offered against an
opposing party and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a
statement on the subject;

(D) was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the
scope of that relationship and while it existed; or
(E) was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Subsection (a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The
hearsay rule is not applicable in declarations of devices and 1nachines, e.g., radar.
The definition of "hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the same as Rule
63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It
deviates from the federal rule in that it allows use of prior statements as
substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the wih1ess has forgotten, and does
not require the prior state1nent to have been given under oath or subject to
perjury. The former Utah rules admitted such statements as an exception to the
hearsay rule. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), with respect to
confrontation problems under the Sixth Amend1nent to the United States

Constitution. Subdivision (d)(l) is as originally promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court with the addition of the language "or the witness denies having
made the statement or has forgotten" and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule
and the actual effect on most juries.
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its interpretation of the
applicable rule in this general area. State v. Slbert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388
(1957).
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah
2d 123, 388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P.2d 786 (1969).
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971 ), as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Similar provisions to subdivisions (d)(2)(B) and (C) were contained in Rule 63(8),
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Rule 63(9), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), was of similar substance and scope to
subdivision (d)(2)(D), except that Rule 63(9) required that the declarant be
unavailable before such admissions are received. Adoptive and vicarious
admissions have been recognized as admissible in criminal as well as civil cases.
Stnte v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).
Statements by a coconspira tor of a party made during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, admissible as non-hearsay under subdivision
(d)(2)(E), have h·aditionally been ad1nitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. State
v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941). Rule 63(9)(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971), was broader than this rule in that it provided for the admission of
state1nents made while the party and declarant were participating in a plan to
com1nit a crime or a civil wrong if the statement was relevant to the plan or its
subject matter and made while the plan was in existence and before its complete
execution or other termination.

ADDENDUM

B

Relevant Jury Instructions (R272-81)

-

Addendum B

INSTRUCTION NO.

2Y

OFFENSE REQUIRES CONDUCT AND MENTAL STA TE:

A person cannot be found guilty of a criminal offense unless that person's
conduct is-prohibited by law, AND at the time the conduct occurred, the defendant
demonstrated a particular mental state specified by law.
"Conduct" can mean both an "act" or a failure to act when the law requires a
person to act. An "act" is a voluntary movement of the body and it can include
speech.
As to the "mental state" requirement, the prosecution must prove that at the
time the defendant acted (or failed to act), he/she did so with a particuiar mental
state. For each offense, the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant
had to have, if any. For some crimes the defendant.must have acted 'interitio1:1-ally"
or "knowingly". For other crimes it is enough that the defendant acted
"recklessly 11 , "with criminal negligence" or with some other specified mental state.
Later, I will instruct you on the specific conduct and mental state that the
prosecution must prove before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime(s)
charged.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

25

INTENTIONAL, KNOWING AND RECKLESS MENTAL STATES:
As I stated in another instruction, the prosecution must prove that at the time
the defendant acted, he/she did so with a particular mental state. For each offense,
the law defines what kind of mental state the defendant had to have, if any.

For the crime(s) charged in this case, the defendant must have acted
'intentionally" or "knowingly" or recklessly. The prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or
recklessly before the defendant can be found guilty of the crime charged.
A person engages in conduct intentionally or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the ~onduct or cause the result.
,,

A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with resp·ect to
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
A person engages in conduct recklessiy with respeci to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.

?
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INSTR_UCTION NO.

2h

INFERRING THE REQUIRED MENTAL STA TE:

The law requires that the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant acted with a particular mental state.
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's mental state can be proven
directly, because no one can tell what another person is thinking.
A defendant's mental state can be proved indirectly from the surrounding
facts and circumstances. This includes things like what the defendant said, what
the defendant did, and any other evidence that shows what was in the defendant's
m;nrl
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INSTRUCTION NO.

.,

27

MOTIVE:
A defendant's mental state is not the same as "motive". Motive is why a
person does something. Motive is not an element of the crime(s) charged in this
case. As a result, the pr-osecutor does not have to prove why the defendant acted
(or failed to act).
However, motive or lack of motive may help you determine if the defendant
did what he/she is charged with doing. It may also help you determine what
his/her mental state was at the time.

?.

,~!
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INSTRUCTION NO.

J..2'

The defendant, KEN JOHNSON, is charged in Count I, with Burglary (Domestic
Violence), on or about March 30, 2014. You cannot convict of this offense unless, based on the
evidence you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:
1. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant KEN JOHNSON;

2. Knowingly, intentionally or recklessly;
3. Entered or remained unlawfully in the dwelling of another; and
· 4. With the specific intent to commit:
a. A theft; or
b. An assault on any person.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence you are convinced of the truth of each
and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the
defendant guilty. On the other hand, if you are not convinced that one or more of these elements
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INSTRUCTION NO. _

____.1..._q
_ __

Count 1 charges the defendant with burglary. Trespassing is a lesser included offense of that
charge. As you deliberate, you must detem1ine whether the defendant is guilty ofburglary_guilty
of trespassing or not guilty of either offense. The law does not require you to make these
determinations in any particular order. However, you cannot find the defendant guilty of both
burglary and trespass In other words, you can only return one verdict on count 1: guilty of
burglary, guilty of trespassing, or not guilty of either offense.

The elements for burglary] are set forth in Instruction .25{

The elements for trespassing are set forth in Instruction

30

INSTRUCTION NO. --=---30
The crime of trespassing consists of a number of elements each of which must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to prove even one
yJ

element beyond a reasonable doubt you must find the defendant not guilty.

A person is guilty of criminal trespass if under circumstances not amounting to
burglary:
(a) the person enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any
VfJ

Property O g

(ii) intends to commit ~riy crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the
safety of another;

or

(b) knowing the person's entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters

or remains on property as to which notice against entering is given by personal
communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act

for the owner.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

:)I

Under the laws of the State of Utah, a person commits Burglary if that person enters or
remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with intent tO-Cgmm.it a felel'ly or
@
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theft or to commit an assault on any person.
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Instruction No. - ....

The following definitions apply to Count I:

1. "Dwelling" means a building vJhich is usually occupied by a person
lodging in the building at night, whether or not a person is actually
present.
2. Theft.

A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized

control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof.
"Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a)

To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to

use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic
value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b)

To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other

compensation; or
(c)

To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it

unlikely that the owner will recover it.
3.

Assault is:

{a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes

bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another.

INSTRUCTION NO.
Under Otah law a person can commit an offense known as wrongful
appropriation.

Wrongful appropriation is defined as:

A person commits wrongful appropriation if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another, without the ,consent of

i

I.

Ii

::.:

the owner or legal custodian and with intent to temporarily appropriate,
possess,

or use the property or to temporarily deprive- the owner or legal

custodian of possession of the property.
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Addendum D
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay, when's the last time you were there?

3

A

Just a few months ago.

4

Q

Okay.

5

So a few months ago.

present on March 30,

Okay.

And were

A

I was not.

7

Q

Okay, the day before or the day after?

8

A

I was not.

MR. STANGER:

10

MR. BREEZE:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. BREEZE:

15

THE COURT:

16

leave,

No further questions.
Nothing further.
Thank you.
The defense rests.

All right.

Let's take a break.

Ten minutes?
Yes, but I have a few things, don'c

just let the jury go.

17

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

18

THE COURT:

19

you

2014?

6

9

Just -

Is the State planning on putting on

rebuttal?

20

MR. STANGER:

21

THE COURT:

Ummm,
Okay.

I believe so, Judge.
I would now just comment

that

22

there's been some concern about 39 seconds of that tape being

23

played.

24

claimed he was not - had only had one drink -

25

relevant to hear how he sounded on that day.

I now think it was relevant since the defendant has
it becomes

49
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MR. BREEZE:

2

evidence they intend to bring?

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BREEZE:

·---"---"--~

Now, may I inquire as to what rebuttal

You two can talk about that.
Well,

I don't want to have to object

5

in the presence of the jury and I'm not asking for details

6

just give -

7
8

MR. STANGER:

THE COURT:

10

(inaudible).

It's kind of what we have to do for a

I don't even know that I -

THE COURT:

I don't know that they have

(inaudible) .

14
15

What?

MR. STANGER:

12

13

~

Judge.

9

11

It's kind of what we have to do,

MR. STANGER:

- will but I need to go out and have

a conversation with Ms. Johnson, Heather Johnson.

16

THE COURT:

I'm going to give you 10 or 15 minutes

17

to decide if you're going to and what it might be and then he

18

can discuss it with you.

19

comes in

20

jury.

(inaudible)

You can let me know before the

sometime outside the presence of the

21

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

jury

All right,

is the State going to do any

rebuttal?
MR. STANGER: Judge,
with Ms. Heather Johnson,

I have spoken with Ms.

Johnson,

I'm sorry, and State will not be
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I don't have any rebuttal evidence.

1

calling her.

2

just ask that she be allowed to leave.

3

So ...

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. BREEZE:

6

THE COURT:

She does have wo~k.

Any objection to that?
and the other two witnesses also

No rebuttal.

So we're moving to closings.

We are not ready for jury instructions.

ri..ght.

All

I assume defense wants to pu~ in

12

The defendant did testify.

13

their wrongful appropriation?

14

MR.

15

THE COURT: How about the lesser included?

16

MR. BREEZE:

17

MR. STANGER: Less, that would be

19

Are you

ready for that?

11

18

Thanks

Okay, then they are excused.

for being here.

9
10

No,

would

have the same request.

7
8

Okay.

I

BREEZE: Yes.

Just one second.
(inaudible)

wrongful.
THE COURT:

Wrongful,

commit the offense of

'.\

'\,:ljl

20

21

wrongful appropriation.
MR. STANGER: A lesser included of theft that he's

22

already admitted it?

23

THE COURT:

He's just defining it obviously

so he

24

can claim that was the intent he performed while he was

25

inside rather than - since there has been some evidence of
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1

that,

.

---------·-----------·-·

I'm inclined to let him have it.

2

MR. STANGER:

3

THE COURT:

4

_______.,_,.._________

Okay.
We've got a definition of wrongfully,

wrongful appropriation but then we have argument behind it.

5

MR. BREEZE:

6

THE COURT:

It's just the theory of the case.
Which you can argue.

I don't think you

7

get to submit your theory of the case in a jury instruction.

8

You can submit the wrongful appropriation definition but then

9

you've got to make your own argument.
MR. BREEZE:

10

Well,

I think that you can instruct

actually isn't that what a theory of the case

11

them that

12

instruction is, that the defendant says this is my theory

13

and, you know,

14

gracious and say,

15

theft or the assault count and -

I mean,

hey, but you still need to consider the

THE COURT:

16

I think at the very bottom we're very

You could but are not required to.

17

they find that the facts meet the elements then they are

18

required to find someone guilty.

19

MR. BREEZE:

20

THE COURT:

If

Would you read that last part again?
However, bear in mind that if you were

21

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

22

entered or remained unlawfully with the intent to commit an

23

assault,

24

guilty of burglary under the theory or burglary by assault.

25

You know,

you could but are not required to find the defendant

and you don't talk about if they do - and i f they

52

1

find him guilty of the theft they could also - and you don't

2

mention that in here.

3

wrongful appropriation definition but you're going to have to

4

make your own arguments.
MR. BREEZE:

5
6

THE COURT:

8

MR. BREEZE:

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

And of course of objection is

Uh-huh (affirmative).
And And you're talking about the lesser

included?
MR. BREEZE:

11

12

I'm going to give you the

noted, right?

7

10

Yeah,

Right.

Yeah, let's go ahead and give

them that lesser included.

13

THE COURT:

14

including the lesser included?

15

MR. BREEZE:

16

MR. STANGER:

17

(inaudible)?

18

trespass.

Do you have a verdict form for me

I don't.
How is that a lesser included of this

I don't think there's been any evidence of

The evidence is that he kicked her door in.

19

MR. BREEZE:

20

MR. STANGER:

21

MR. BREEZE:

Entering -

(:\

1./JiV

How does that become a trespass?
It is a trespass.

22

entering unlawfully and,

23

intent,

in fact,

Trespassing is

if you don't have the

then it is trespassing.

24

MR. STANGER:

25

to kick the door d8wn.

He's testified that he had the intent
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2

talking about.
THE COURT:

3
4

Well, that's not the intent I'm

MR. BREEZE:

1

He's talking about the intent to

commit

theft while he was in the house.
MR. BREEZE:

5

I mean,

it's right here, enter or

6

remain unlawfully and criminal trespass is definitely a

7

lesser included of burglary and if they believe that he

8

entered unlawfully then THE COURT:

9

10

assault,

it's a potential lesser included.

11

MR. BREEZE:

12

MR. STANGER:

13

THE COURT:

14

But never committed a theft or an

Right.
He admitted that - I Your issue is the intent and the

intent

was formed on the theft.

15

MR. STANGER:

16

THE COURT:

Yeah.
Okay.

So I'll put them in.

I

need to

17

copy this without the argument.

18

I'm putting them in and I need to number them so that

19

put (inaudible) instruction which number is which jury

20

instruction and then we need to copy them.
MR. STF..NGER:

21

I need to figure out where
can

I

Do they have - I'm trying to type

22

this up but Mr. Johnson's element instruction on the

I'm

23

sorry, on the burglary,

24

dwelling.

25

unlawfully in a dwelling so I'm trying to type that up and

it says entered or remained in a

I think it needs to say entered or remained

G
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1

get it to the clerk.

2

THE COURT:

3

The other thing,

could you put a

lesser included in your verdict form?

4

MR. STANGER:

5

THE COURT:

6

Okay.

I did not.
Could you or do you have it?

Or

can

you email me -

7

MR. STANGER:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. STANGER:

I

Oh,

can make one.

I

don't have

it.

you don't have a copy of it?

This is the wrong computer.

10

my team computer so I don't ...

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STANGER:

13

THE COURT:

Thi:3 is

Okay.
I can get it to you.

Okay,

(inaudible) verdict form.
Let's -

Okay.

14

We need time to do all those things.

I'm going to

15

tell the jury that we're working on all this, that there's no

16

rebuttal.

17

so it may take a few minutes more than 15 so they don't blame

18

it on you.

That we're going to be copying jury instructions

19

MR. BREEZE:

Okay.

20

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

21

THE COURT:

22

of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson.

23

instructions copiej.

24

it had been longer than a 15-break because we were copying

25

all the jury instructions and putting in the ones that you

Okay, we're back in the matter of state

The -

Ummm, we got the jury

I went in and told the jury that
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1

had all brought this morning that I had given you the

2

opportunity to bring and the State was deciding whether to do

3

rebuttal and all that and they said, Well, when we get

4

case are we going to be able to listen to the tapes?

5

there a transcript of the tapes?

6

transcripts of the tapes, we will discuss whether you get to

7

hear the tapes.

8

think they should get to hear the 911 tape and the 39 seconds

9

that I allowed of the other tape.

10

this

Is

So I said there's no

So, since they are admitted into evidence I

We'll have to have counsel

go in and make sure that's all they hear.
MR. BREEZE:

11

Ummm,

I object.

Number one,

I

don't

12

believe that they actually were admitted into evidence and as

13

-

14

on the record for appeal purposes but I don't think they were

15

ever formally admitted and we can't let - we can't let

16

lawyers go back and be part of jury deliberations.

17

18
19

I mean they were marked at my request so that they would be

THE COURT:

Well,

the

the lawyers are not going to be

saying anything when they go back.
MR. BREEZE:

Well,

I still don't think that i t ' s

20

proper and the idea that they're going to have back there a -

21

that we're going to have to back and supervise their

22

listening to the tape is -

23

24
25

THE COURT:

The only reason I would let the lawyers

back is so that you can see that nothing is said to the
MR. BREEZE:

jury.

And then we're into this thing that

@
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1

you brought up,

2

prosecutor but you brought up that,

3

is now relevant,

oh,

the whole 39

seconds

I think that's what you said.

THE COURT:

4

5

sounded like you were trying to help the

What I'm doing is supporting my rule in

admitting it.

MR. BREEZE:

6

But when it was originally admitted,

7

the ruling was that only the part about the, that I went

8

over.

9

That THE COURT:

When I originally admitted it I

told

10

the State they could start from the beginning and go through

11

to the part where the defendant made an admission.

12

reason we did that was because it's too out of context to

13

just pull the four seconds out of it.

14

That's what I allowed,

15

want to listen to it,

16

can put your objection on the record.

17

MR. BREEZE:

He did what I

that's what's been admitted.

The

said.
If

they

I'm going to let them listen to i t . You

Well,

we're objecting and one of the

18

reasons is that the only reason that you allowed them to play

19

the whole 39 seconds was because in the beginning they told

20

you there was nothing of significance,

21

until the comment,

22

it was all innocuous

until the four seconds that mattered.

TIIS COURT:

No one told me things were innocuous.

23

I allowed it because it needs to be in the context of the

24

phone call that's made and since it was at the beginning of

25

what was it, a 4-minute phone call,

I felt like 39 seconds

57

..... ··•---· -·-·. ··-· --····--··-·--•-- ·-···-··· .... ··---· . ·- -•-···· -----~··•···· - - - - - - · ·-· _______ .. ___ ----

- - - ..·---·---·-·· -----·-·..·---.. -•--·-··..-•-·•-·-·-----~-1

was reasonable compared to allowing the whole four minutes.

2

Okay.
MR. BREEZE:

3
4

And so my objection is on the record,

right?

5

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).

6

CLERK:

7

THE COURT: As I've said before.

(Inaudible).
The only things

8

that last in that record are what is scanned in.

9

longer take physical things any more.

10

(Inaudible conversation)

12

THE COURT:

14

You just have to keep

it {inaudible).

11

13

We no

Oh no,

G

it's admitted as evidence.

(Inaudible} .
MR. BREEZE: But just so the record is clear,

it's

15

my position that it was never admitted as evidence,

16

one of those disks,

17

request so that they would be available for appellate review.

18

neither

that they were admitted only at my

THE COURT:

They were admitted.

I was not thrilled

19

with allowing the jury to listen to them but we said we'll

20

wait and see if they really want them.

21

they've been admitted, we'll let them have them.

Now they want them,

22

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom)

23

THE COURT:

24

presence of the jury,

25

Ken Montey Johnson.

We're back in the matter of,

in the

in the matter of the state of Utah vs.
We have jury instructions.

We will pass
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1

but first I'm going to tell you that the - we have eight

2

jurors and one alternate.

3

sorry that we do that to you but we've had so many times

4

where someone gets in a car wreck or somebody gets sick or

5

something like that happens and it's very difficult to do a

6

jury trial so we want to make sure that we don't have to do

7

it more than once.

8

excused.

9

have to call you back.

Our alternate is No. 23 and

I'm

So you're going to get your lunch and be

I want you to leave your phone number in case we

10

(Whereupon the bailiff was sworn)

11

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom at 12: 3 l: 00)

12

THE COURT:

13

Have a seat.

Anything we need the

record for?
MR. BREEZE:

14

Not really,

I

just assume we just need

15

to give our cell numbers to the clerk and stay within

16

minutes.
THE COURT:

17

Ten would be better.

Ummm,

15

I'm going

18

to have the prosecutor show the bailiff how to play those

19

things, probably just the bailiff will go in.

20

MR. STANGER:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR.

23

24
25

STANGER:

Are they going to eat lunch first?
Yeah.
Okay,

I

wonder how long that w il.L

take.
THE COURT:
office is 10 minutes,

So yeah,
isn't it?

leave your numbers.

Your

You're still on Broadway,
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1

aren't you?
MR. BREEZE:

2
3

No,

I sold that place and I moved down

to 3900 South.
THE COURT:

4

Oh.

The problem is we often have

5

questions and stuff that we'll end up having to call you back

6

for.

7

MR. BREEZE:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BREEZE:

I plan on staying close by.
Okay.
I would like to be present when

10

gives the instructions to the bailiff.

11

idea of when that is going to be?
THE COURT:

12
13

So do we have any
Q

No, probably within the next half hour

I would hope.

14

CLERK:

15

THE COURT:

16

here.

I

can have him come back in (inaudible) .
Lock them up and then we' 11 get him out

Ask Jason to come on back.

17

(Whereupon a recess was taken until 2:14:34)

18

THE COURT:

19

he

Johnson.

We're back in state vs. Ken Montey

There were a couple of questions while the

jury was
r."\

~

20

out.

We kept them so that you could take a look at them and

21

how I answered them.

22

CLERK:

23

THE COURT:

Do we have them?

(Inaudible) .
They asked whether you could formulate

24

intent only before entering or after entering and they asked

25

why was the one jury instruction included.

Let me give that
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to you in case you want to put any objections on the record.

1

2

MR. BREEZE:

3

Do you remember what the Instruction

33 was?
THE COURT:

4

Yes,

it's the one about, ummm,

the

temporary taking, what's it called?

5

6

MR. STANGER:

7

MR. BREEZE:

8

THE COURT:

Appropriation.
Oh, appropriation?
I think so.

So I basically said what's

in that jury instruction, you determine which instructions

9

are important·and to read them as a whole and ...

10

MR. BREEZE:

11

12

But it doesn't say read them as

a

-

well you said -

13

THE COURT:

Yes, it does in that jury instruction.

14

MR. BREEZE:

15

{Inaudible conversation)

16

THE COURT:

Let me just take a look here.

These instructions I gave you before

17

the trial, any instructions I may give to you and these

18

instructions.

19

consider them as a whole.

20

instructions are given does not mean that some instructions

21

are more important than others.

22

instruction applies may depend upon what you decide are the

23

true facts of the case.

24

All instructions are important, you should
The order in which the

Whether any particular

Also refers to the argument because I know that was
part of your argument you wanted them to consider.

25

So that's
101
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1

why I mentioned argument as well.
MR. BREEZE:

2

And so just for the record, we object

3

to what you gave on the question regarding the reason for

4

Instruction No. 33.

5

said because, words to the effect of because the defendant's

6

theory of the case is that he only wanted to temporarily

7

deprive and so for that reason we move for a mistrial.
THE COURT:

8
9

We believe that Your Honor should have

Allowing them to decide the

significance of the instruction based on their own theories

10

of argument and testimony is the appropriate way to

11

than to restate defendant's theory so I'm going to deny your

12

motion for a mistrial and allow it to stand.
Okay,

13

I guess we' re ready to bring the jury in.

THE COURT:

15

We're back in the matter of state of

16

Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson.

17

they have a verdict.

18

FOREPERSON:

19

THE COURT:

The jury has indicated that

The foreperson,

give me their number.

No. 3.
All right, and you've reached a

verdict?

21

FOREPERSON:

22

THE COURT:

23

rather

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom at 2:22:10}

14

20

go

please?

Yes, we have.

Would you hand it to the bailiff

We'll have the clerk read that.

24

CLERK:

25

entitled action,

We,

the jury empaneled in the above

find the defendant, Ken Montey Johnson,
102
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1

Count 1, burglary, guilty.

2

guilty.

·,j)

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. BREEZE:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay.

I'll go through each one and

I'll just ask you to tell me if that was your verdict.

8

Number l?

9

JUROR 1:

Yes.

10

THE COURT: Number 2?

11

JUROR 2: Yes.

12

THE COURT: Number 3?

13

JUROR 3: Yes.

14

THE COURT: Number 8?

15

JUROR 8: Yes.

16

THE COURT: Nine?

17

JUROR 9: Yes.

18

THE COURT: And ten?

19

JUROR 10: Yes.

20

THE COURT: Eleven?

21

JUROR 11: Yes.

22

THE COURT: Seventeen?

23

JUROR 17: Yes.

24

THE COURT:

25

Would anyone like the jury

polled?

5

7

not

Signed and dated.

3

4

Count 2, threat of violence,

Your service is now completed.

discuss the case with anybody that you want to.

You can

We'll take
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1

you back to your jury room. You're welcome to leave if you

2

want or if you have any questions I'll be back in just a

3

couple of minutes.

4

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom}

5

THE COURT:

6

sentencing date.

7

from AP&P?

Have a seat.

So we need to set a

Are we going to get a presentence report

8

MR. STANGER:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
All right,

it takes them 45 days.

10

That's going to put us out to about November 21 st

11

have a calendar on that date?
MR. STANGER:

12
13

I

•

Do we

Q

think I have a sentencing on that

date.

14

CLERK: Yes.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BREEZE:

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. STANGER:

All right.

Does that work for you?

Yes.
All right.
Judge, based on the conviction the

19

State would ask that he be taken into custody.

20

poses a danger based on his conduct throughout this case and

21

pursuant to the statute the presumption is that he goes

22

custody on the felony two conviction.
THE COURT:

23

24
25

Okay.

We bel~eve he

into

Go ahead. Do you wish to respond

to that?
MR. BREEZE:

Yes,

it's under 77-20 and the -

you
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r--·1

after Mr. Johnson had left the home did you fill this

2

you remember?

3

4

A

out, do

i t was

I don't remember how long it was exactly but

pretty quickly after.

The officer was there pretty quickly.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

Oh yeah, yes.

7

Q

Okay. And is that the statement written to the best

8

So you were still shaking?

that you could remember at that time?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Describe your thoughts at that time.

11

A

I still just couldn't believe everything that had

12

just happened.

I was scared.

13

that before, ever.

I've never been scared like

14

Q

And is that - is that your statement actually?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

And how do you know that's your statement?

17

A

'Cause that's what happened and that's what

18

wrote.

19

Q

Okay. And is your name written on that?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Has your signature on the document?

22

A

Yes.

23

24
25

MR. STANGER:

I

State would move to admit State's

Exhibit 4 into evidence.
MR. BREEZE:

It's clearly hearsay.

She can testify

97
---·.,·--·-··--·······----..-·..-·-·•·-••--··---·--•--·-··....·---·--··..···-·-··---------..--,...... _,_ ..

___ ______________,
.,

- - - - - - - _.,,._____________ -·-·---···--·---

·--····-----·---···---------·------,

1

about what she wants to testify about.

2

made by a declarant, the declarant does not make while

3

testifying at the trial or hearing.

4

MR. STANGER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. STANGER:

7

This is a statement

It's hearsay.

Inconsistent statement, Judge.
Prior inconsistent statement?
(Inaudible).

Thjs particular

statement was made under penalty of perjury.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. BREEZE :

I 1 m going to admit it.
Wait, Your Honor,

is it - may be

10

prosecutor could tell us what this is offered to rebut

11

required by Rule 801D(l) (b).
THE COURT:

12
13

(Coughing).

the

as
Q

(Inaudible) cross examination.

Sorry.

14

MR. STANGER: If i could retrieve that document.

15

THE COURT:

16
17

Q

20

21

(BY MR. STANGER}

So, when you talked to 911

MR. BREEZE:
Q

Objection -

(BY MR. STANGER)

Is that right?

MR. BREEZE:

You just testified.

about blank, he wants her to say yes.

23

question is what did you tell them.

25

She's already

testified to it.

22

24

and

you told them about him breaking in -

18
19

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. STANGER:

You told them

The proper form of the

She's previously testified to i t .

I

can ask it again.
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1
2

Q

MR. BREEZE:

7
8

THE COURT:

Q

MR. BREEZE:

First we would like foundation to show

that she actually remembers what she said to 911.

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

THE WITNESS:

19

What did you say to 911 about

what he did to you?

MR. STANGER:

18

It's hard to respond for me right now.

(BY MR. STANGER)

11

17

He

Why don't you just ask her what she said.

9

10

Objection, leading question.

should ask what did she tell 911.

5
6

When you spoke with 911 did you

tell them about -

3

4

(BY MR. STANGER)

She's already testified to that.

I'm just asking for a foundation.
Do you know what you said to 911?
Yes.
What did you say?
About him pushing me, grabbing my

wrist and pushing me down the stairs.
Q

(BY MR. STANGER)

Did he actually push you down the

stairs though?

20

A

No.

21

Q

And what did you say in your statement regarding

22

23

that same incident?
A

In my written statement I believe I said the

24

thing, that he threatened to throw me down the stairs -

25

push me.

same
or
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1
2

Q

Do you remember - did you talk to a Detective

Herbert -

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

- about this case?

5

occurred?

6

A

Ummm,

7

Q

Okay.

8

I think it was a week, week and a half

later.

At that time did you talk about - what did
~

you tell MR. BREEZE:

9

MR. STANGER:

10
11

Do you rem8mber when that

I'm going to object I haven't even asked the question,

G

Judge.
MR. BREEZE:

12

The cats out of the bag.

He's about

13

to say did you tell the detective blank, have her say yes.

14

The proper form of the question is what did you tell the

15

detective.
MR. STANGER:

16
17

18

I've got to be able to ask the

question.
THE COURT:

All right.

Go back a step (coughing}.

I don't know what is happening to me now,

19

Under hearsay -

20

course now (coughing).

21

declarant testifies (coughing) and is subject to cross

22

examination under D-1 about a prior statement and the

23

statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony,

24

that's all it takes.

25

(inaudible).

of

The declarant's prior - if the

Q

The rest are 'or' or that denies

It just has to be a consistent prior statement.

r\

Vil
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1

I'm going to admit it.

2

MR. BREEZE:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BREEZE:

Well, wait a minute, Your Honor.
I've ruled (coughing).
Well,

(Inaudible) .

I wanted to make my objection

5

and say a - the rule says a prior consistent statement

6

it's offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the

7

declarant recently fabricated.

8

THE COURT:

9

if

There's nothing to rebut.

That's under an 'or', D-l(a) says,

uis

consistent with the declarant's testimony."

10

MR. BREEZE:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

14

other ones are 'or's.

15

MR. BREEZE:

It says 'and'.
It says 'or' in my rules.
Well, you're looking at D-l(a).
So it's admissible under D-1 (a) .

The

If you look at D-l(b) you and the

16

prosecutor both claimed that this is a consistent statement.

17

Under D-l(b) a consistent statement can only be offered to

18

rebut.

19

THE COURT: Now where (coughing}.

20

MR. BREEZE:

21

the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BREEZE:

24
25

It says it has to be consistent with

Where, what one are you under?
That's 0-l(b), that's Rule 801A-D-

1 ( b} .

THE COURT:

That's an 'or'.
101
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1

MR. BREEZE:

2

THE COURT:

3

'or'.

4

admissible under 1 ( b) .

5

says 'or'.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. STANGER:

9

THE COURT:

11

---------------You' re look inq at-

I'm looking at O-l(a),

it's admissible or it could be

I don't need both l(a) and 1 ( b) .

Well, Your Honor

I'm going to admit it.
I

apologize to the jury then?

{BY MR. STANGER)

Did you speak with Detective

G

Herbert?
Yes,

13

Q

And did you recount what happened?

14

A

Yes,

15

Q

I did.

I told him everything that -

MR. BREEZE:

16

THE COURT:

MR. BREEZE:

21

THE WITNESS:

24
25

I couldn't hear that

last

He asked if she recounted what

happened.

20

23

Excuse me,

comment.

18

22

G

Yes.

A

19

It

-

12

17

it finishes with

~

MR. BREEZE:

Q

.........

it says 'and' .

So if it's under 0-1 ( a)

6

10

No,

__

No,

the answer.

I said yes,

I told him everyth~ng

that happened.
Q

(BY MR. STANGER)

Did you talk to - did you talk to

him about these punches that you testified about?
A

I don't remember if I did.
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1
2

Q

Okay.

Did you receive a phone call from Mr.

Johnson after this happened?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

Okay, did he talk to you about - what was the phone

5

call that you received?

6

A

The phone call was a voice mail.

7

Q

Okay, and what was that regarding?

8

A

Ummm, he was still very angry with me, yelling at

9

me, pretty much telling me that, Go ahead, get him arrested

I don't really remember exactly

10

for kicking down my door.

11

everything he said on there because I only heard it two or

12

three times.

13

Q

Did you record - you have that voice mail?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Okay. And did you provide that to Detective

16
17

Herbert?
A

Yes.
MR. STANGER:

18

I don't know if you want to break.

19

need to set up the phone call.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. STANGER:

22

THE COURT:

23

1 unch.

Oh, all right.
If you want to break for lunch.
We' 11 go ahead and have a break for

Come back at 1: 0 0,

you' re on your own (coughing) .

24

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

25

THE COURT:

Maybe I'll be better by 1:00.
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1

MR. BREEZE:

Your Honor,

I have to again I'm moving

2

for a mistrial.

3

the statement in is completely unlawful.

4

is -

5

You've misread the rule of evidence allowing

THE COURT:

It starts with D-1,

D-1 (a) says

that it

"A declarants

6

witness prior statement.

The declarant testifies and is

7

subject to cross examination about a prior statement and the

8

statement D-l(a) is consistent with the declarant's testimony

9

or the declarant denies having made the statement, or has

10

forgotten or" all these things.

11

those things.

12
13

It only has to be one of
~

MR. BREEZE:

Well, number one, nobody is claiming

that it was inconsistent with her testimony -

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BREEZE:

That's why it's - that she's just given and a

16

declarant had not denied making the statement or has

17

forgotten and then (coughing) you get to {b) it's allowed if

18

it's consistent and offered to rebut an express or impli~d

19

charge that the declarant

20

THE COURT:

(coughing) fabricated.

Didn't she just say she didn't rem~mber

21

whether she told them that he threw punches,

22

something that's been forgotten.

23

MR. BREEZE:

so we have

There may be one thing; however,

24

you look at the statement itself,

25

about punches.

j_f

it doesn't mention anything

In fact 104
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BREEZE:

So it's inconsistent.
Right.

But inconsistent is only

3

allowed if it's offered to rebut a charge that she fabr ic:ated

4

and so you've allowed this in, in the absence of - there's no

5

claim that she fabricated this.

6

know where the exhibit it but THE COURT:

7
8

MR. BREEZE:

So which are you going after,

Well,

it's not admissible under either

because first of all THE COURT:

11

12

And I don't.

inconsistent or consistent?

9

10

(Coughing) .

She's already testified - you' re

saying

it's inconsistent -

13

MR. BREEZE:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BREEZE:

I'm not saying - a second ago.
- they're the ones that are offering

16

it.

17

You claimed that this written statement is inconsistent with

18

the defendant's testimony.

They're claiming - actually they didn't claim anything.

~\

vii

THE COURT:

19

I've been going -

20

they're going under consistent.

21

me?

22
23

MR. STANGER:

I was assuming

Why don't we have you tell

We are going with it's consistent,

prior consistent statement.

24

MR. BREEZE:

25

is that what he said?

Well,

I think he just said consistent,

105
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. BREEZE:

---

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Okay, if it's consistent,

I see he

3

doesn't have his rules of evidence here, if it's consistent

4

it has to be offered to rebut a claim of fabrication.

5

unaware of any claims at this stage of the trial of a

6

fabrication.

7

8

9

10

THE COURT:

happens on cross.

(Coughing} .

I'm

Let's wait and see what

Is there anything else?

MR. STANGER:
MR. BREEZE:

No, Judge.
I take it you're denying our motion

11

for a mistrial at this stage?

12

THE COURT:

13

(Whereupon a noon recess was taken)

14

THE COURT:

Yes.

All right, we're back in the matter of

15

state of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson.

16

a coughing fit, which I've had this since Friday, that's the

17

first time that has happened.

18

the hearsay and I think Mr. Breeze is correct.

19

them all as consis·cent, but that first one is inconsistent,

20

the other ones are consistent.

21

MR. STANGER:

After I stopped having

I got a chance to read through

Judge,

I was reading

I think it comes in under

22

alternative theories as well, so it comes in as a presen~

23

sense impression.

She testified that she -

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. STANGER:

(Inaudible) .
- was at or near the time of the

106
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event that happened,

2

THE COURT:

- - - - - - - - --------

so ...
So at any rate,

let's hold it back

3

until we get through cross and decide about all of these

4

together.

5

qualify under some of these other exceptions under 803.

6

don't think having it in the jury's hands for two minutes is

7

a big enough error yet to declare a mistrial.
MR. BREEZE:

8

9

THE COURT:

I

am concerned that

I

I

kind

And I will tell the jury that you were

being insistent because you were right, okay?

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

14

Your Honor,

I do think i t may

of had to tussle with you in the presence of the jury -

10

11

In the meantime I don't think,

were right.

Okay.

I'll let them know I was wrong,

you

Okay.
I don't know if you wanted to hear

MR. STANGER:

15

And then I guess -

16

the - that he had made a motion that to hear the phone call

17

before -

18
19

THE COURT:

Oh yeah, how long is it?

just play it read quick.

20

MR. STANGER:

21

THE COURT:

Why don't you

You got it all keyed up?
It's like three minutes.

Okay,

let's hear it before the

It is not in right now.

jury

22

comes back in.

So that's another

23

reason I'm going to leave it away from them so that they know

24

that you were right and I didn't,

25

to them yet.

I shouldn't have given it
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1

MR. BREEZE:

2

THE COURT:

Was it published?
I don't know.

Did you ever hand

it: to
G.,

3

the jury?

4

MR. STANGER:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. STANGER:

So we'll take it back from them

It should be with you now.

THE COURT:
matter with you,

~

They were looking at me like what's the

so ...

11

MR. STANGER:

12

vibrating (inaudible).

I'll get it level so it's not

13

(Phone message played - not transcribed)

14

THE COURT:

15

18

{Q

It's pretty hard to understand.

there any way to make it clearer or do you have a transcript?
MR. STANGER:

16
17

Q

Urnmm,

you've got to get the right amount -

9

10

Okay.

handed it to the jury.

I

so they know -

7
8

Yes,

I don't have a transcript of i t .

Ummm MR. BREEZE:

May I

just comment?

I think that to

19

the extent that the comment is, you know, that there's

a

20

confession in there that "I entered the house," I think 5_t's

21

allowable although the whole tape is extremely prejudicial

22

and we're willing to stipulate that he entered the home

r::·,

\1:ii'

23

without consent and that he kicked in the door.

24

willing to stipulate to that -

25

MR. STANGER:

We're

I don't understand why we' re

108
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if that's the stipulation THE COURT:

2
3

Because then you've got the element of

commit a theft or an assault.

4

MR. STANGER:

He's already admitted to the theft.

5

So what are we trying?

6

stipulating that he entered the home -

I don't understand.

MR. BREEZE:

7

If he's

Obviously now I understand why we're

8

in trial here.

The prosecutor doesn't understand the

9

elements of the offense.

At any rate, all of the stuff,

10

too prejudicial, all of this £-you this, vindictive,

11

all of that is too prejudicial.

12

any element.

13

there, the four seconds of that, we don't object -

15

that come?

16

time -

17

None of that goes to prove

At what point does the four seconds of

I was listening for that and I'm having a

MR. STANGER:

entering, whatever you think I did to you.

19

the front end of that.

20

MR. BREEZE:

21

THE COURT:

23

hax·d

Arrest me for the breaking and

18

22

f-you,

To the extent that there i£ a confession in

THE COURT:

14

it's

It's kind of at

But we're willing to Why don't you just play the front end

of it then?
MR. BREEZE:

We're willing to stipulate to that and

24

- but here's a problem.

All the rest of that, everything

25

else that doesn't have anything to do with the elements of
109

We made a request for them to

1

the offense is 404B evidence.

2

produce, they've never given us notice and now they want to

3

come in and bring all this, you know, f-you, you're a

4

b-i-t-c-h, you know, and all of this horribly prejudicial

5

material that doesn't have anything to do with any element in

6

the case.

7

seconds,

8

still not object to that or in the alternative you can

9

tell them that we've agreed and stipulated that he did in

So our position is if they want to play the
fine.

four

It's technically not a confession but we'll
just

10

fact enter the house without - over her objection and he

11

kicked in the door,
THE COURT:

12

13

kicked the door open.
Do you want a stipulation or do you

want the front part of that tape?
MR. STANGER:

14

I mean,

I want the front part of the

15

tape 'cause I've already told the jury I'm going to play it

16

for them.

Ummm - ~ut I ...

I'm going to allow the part where he

THE COURT:

17
18

discusses coming into the house.

19

the whole three minutes.

20

minutes long but that's the only pertinent part.
MR. BREEZE:

21
22

25

You can discuss that it's three
Okay.

All right and then - okay, you're

going to explain to the jury about the THE COURT:

23

24

We don't have to go through

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Let's get the

jury back.
We should make sure that he's got it

MR. BREEZE:

110
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cued up to that part before we bring them in.

1

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BREEZE:

It's the beginning,
Well,

isn't it?

I think there's a little before.

It would just be nice to have it cued up.

4

THE COURT:

5

Yeah, you may get stuck with what' .s

6

before.

It's going to be hard to cue it up to exactly before

7

the statement he's looking for.

8

(Tape played again)

9

MR. STANGER:

I mean,

that's what he's talking

about so I think that's -

10

THE COURT:

11

Yeah, start at the beginning.

I t ' s so

hard to understand.

12

13

MR. BREEZE:

We'd object.

14

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

15

THE COURT: Okay, we're back in the presence of the

16

jury on the matter of the State of Utah versus Ken Montey

17

Johnson.

18

I'm starting with a cough drop early before I have a problem.

19

After getting my tears out of my eyes and reading the hearsay

20

statement, defense counsel is correct, which is probably_why

21

he's having a hard time with me,

22

statement is not admissible under Rule 801.

23

it back from you for now.

It's not admissible at this point

24

in the trial.

I was wrong.

25

and let the state -

I'm going to tell you after {inaudible) done and

He's right;

because he's right that the
So we have taken

So we'll go ahead
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1

A

No.

2

MR. BREEZE:

3

MR. STANGER:

6
7

Sorry.

FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION

4
5

Nothing further.

BY MR. STANGER:
Q

Did you think Mr. Johnson was going to give you

your phone back?

8

A

No.

9

Q

So at the time he left your house, did you believe

10
11

you were ever going to get your phone back?
A

No.

12

MR. STANGER:

13

TfiE COURT:

14

No further questions.
All right, you can step down.

W

need a break?

15

MR. STANGER:

16

THE COURT:

17

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom)

18

THE COURT:

19

Do we

I think so, yeah.

Okay, we'll take a 10-minute break.

Have a seat.

Anything we need to

discuss outside the presence of the jury?

20

MR. BREEZE:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BREEZE:

Excuse me,

just or.e second.

Yeah.
I had made another motion for a

23

mistrial at the bench conference because the prosecutor

24

didn't just play the four seconds indicated in the tape.

25

played that part about where Mr. Johnson is saying f-thi3 and
145
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1

f-that,

very prejudicial.

2

then all of a sudden, boom, there it goes right in front of

3

the jury.
THE COURT:

4

We asked that that not happen and

I didn't say that there wasn't ever

5

going to be an f-this or f-that.

6

the beginning of the tape.
MR. BREEZE:

7

What I said was just play

And we had argued that if you allowed

8

him to do that, that there's - what's going to happen is that

9

bad things are going to come in and we asked that you have

10

him cue it up to the relevant portion and play that only.
THE COURT:

11

12

And I told him he could play i t

from

the beginning.

13

MR. BREEZE:

Yes,

and for that reason and in

light

14

of the prejudicial f-this and f-that that came in, we're

15

asking for a mistrial.
THE COURT:

16
17

said.

18

tape?

That's all in the context of what he

They didn't play more than what, 10 seconds of that

19

MR. STANGER:

It went, it went -

20

MR. BREEZE:

Thirty-nine seconds.

21

THE COURT:

22

That's cutting it

pretty tight.

23

MR. BREEZE:

24

THE COURT:

25

Thirty-nine seconds.

That's I'm not going to declare a mistrial

because the f-word might have been heard along with h~s

146

- - - - - - - - - ··-·-•-------··

.---------··-----...... --.-·-··-------·--1

statements about kicking the door in.
MR. BREEZE:

2

One followup on that point, at

have a

3

point the prosecutor is going to need to just make,

4

copy burned of only the relevant four seconds because

5

going to go back THE COURT:

6
7

some

i f it's

Well, let's just not have it go back

unless he wants to try to burn the four seconds.

8

MR. STANGER:

9

probably do it, but ...
THE COURT:

10

I think if they request we can

Okay.

Right now I'm just thinking I'd

11

hate to think of them playing it back and forth and back and

12

forth,

you know,

trying to make out every word of it.

13

Anything else?

14

MR. BREEZE:

15

MR. STANGER:

16
17

No.
And Judge,

I think the door was

opened to the 911 tape being played.

MR. BREEZE:

We totally disagree.

We played one

18

discreet section that dealt only with - to impeach her

19

because of prior existing statement, that's all we did and

20

we're entitled to do that.

21

THE COURT:

I

think,

ummm,

you have expressly or

22

implied that the declarant has fabricated at some point both

23

on her 911 tape and in her statement.

24

opened the door for both of those things to be admissible at

25

this point.
147
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1

MR. BREEZE:

Well,

I think that the record would

2

have to disclose what - instead of just a general you have

3

opened,

4

question has -

I think you have to say this question or that

THE COURT:

5

Saying that she didn't discuss punching

6

in the statement,

7

you down the stairs or could or whichever.
MR. BREEZE:

8

9

saying that whether it was a should th~ow

So now under Rule 801 the prosecutor,

if they want to can come back with a consistent statement.

10

That's their,

11

with prior inconsistent statements.

12

and show prior consistent statements.

13

doesn't have any THE COURT:

14
15

that's all they can do.

She's been impeached
Now they can come back
That's all they

There are things consistent in that

statement with what her testimony has been.
MR. BREEZE:

16

Well, not really but I guess they

17

could try.

18

back now since she's off the stand, they could come back and

19

offer prior consistent statements.

20

do.

21

They could come back with prior - they can come

THE COURT:

But they have offered it.

22

offered in that written statement.

23

her back on the stand.

24

MR. BREEZE:

25

THE COURT:

But that's all they can

They've

They don't have to put

Well -

At any rate 148
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MR. BREEZE:

2

THE COURT:

Gw

- and -

I don't know what they're going to
~

3

offer,

so ...
Well, they'd have to articulate

MR. BREEZE:

4

5

exactly what statement it is in that document that they'~e

6

talking about that is a consistent statement.

7

thing doesn't come in,

8

that they believe is in there,

9

can have it read into the record by the detective.
THE COURT:

10

The whole

just only the consistent statement
they can get that in.

Well, all these b~ts and pieces

They

Q

of

11

things ... You're taking a bunch of stuff out of context and I

12

don't think it's appropriate or helpful for the jury and when

13

we start taking bits and pieces of things,

14

want to admit the whole tr.ing.

G

it just makes me
~

Well, unfortunately we find ourselves

MR. BREEZE:

15

~

16

in situations where a witness in a diary might have 390

17

pages-

Q

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BREEZE:

20

THE COURT:

21

MR.

Well,

this isn't a diary -

That's just an example.
G;;

22

BREEZE:

-

it's a paragraph.
They have 390 pages of comments

in a

diary -

GJ
23

24
25

THE COURT:

Three hundred and ninety pages is not a

helpful example MR. BREEZE:

- and there's one -

~
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THE COURT:

1

2

- when we are dealing with one

paragraph.
MR. BREEZE:

3

If there's one statement in a

3 9 O-;--page

4

diary that is prior consistent, they can elicit that prior

5

consistent statement.

6

diary.
THE COURT:

7

8

They do not get to admit the entire

How about if the entire diary is

consistent MR. BREEZE:

9
10

THE COURT:

11

MR. BREEZE:

Well,

then they need to-

- with - go through and itemize every

12

statement in there that's consistent and make their argument

13

to Your Honor.

But they can't just go, Oh, let's throw the

14

whole diary in,

there's a one-page or one-sentence consistent

15

statement on Page 294,
THE COURT:

16
17

to me.

let's throw the whole thing in there.
Everything is looking pretty consistent

All right.

18

What's the State's response?

19

MR. STANGER:

The State stated what she's

20

testified, as to what's in that statement.

21

on it,

22

there are inconsistent -

23

show that -

she's been alleged to have been not truthful and that

24
25

She was cros.:ied

MR. BREEZE:

I think the statement can come in to

You need to tell us what statement in

that -
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1

MR. STANGER:

2

MR. BREEZE:

3

THE COURT:

The entire statement is consistent.
We need to go through No, we do not need to go through

4

by line.

It's consistent.

5

offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the

6

declarant recently fabricated that

7

influence which you have also put in by talking about

8

money owed.

9

admissible under 803 -

It's a consi=.tent statement

(inaudible)

improper

It is admissible under 801-D ( 1} (b) .

10

MR. BREEZE:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BREEZE:

line

the

It's

also

Okay, here's - recorded recollection, No. 5.

G

No. 1, though, Your Honor, we have to

13

address each of those.

14

It doesn't meet the requirement of that.

15

recollection is only a matter that the witness once knew

16

about but now cannot recall well enough to testify.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BREEZE:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. BREEZE:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

24
25

It is not a recorded recollection.
A

recorded

Fully and accurately.
Right, and that's Well you' re saying she's not accurate.
Well, as to various comments.
And then there's things she says

I

don't remember.
MR.

BREEZE:

And then the present sense impres:~ion,

this is - she testified herself THE

COURT:

I didn't say present sense - I

just
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said recorded recollection.
MR. BREEZE:

2

Well, this is - doesn't meet the

3

requirements of a recorded recollection and if we look

4

report, Your Honor,

the -

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. BREEZE:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BREEZE:

9

10

11
12

I'm sorry, the 1102 statement Oh, okay.
It starts out "my exhusband came home
That's not in

dispute.
THE COURT: "Came to my home drunk,
to answer the door."
MR. BREEZE:

14

THE COURT:

16

What report?

drunk and I did not want to answer the door."

13

15

at the

I did not want

That is a consistent
That is - it's consistent with the testimony

she's given.
MR. BREEZE:

But we -

it doesn't - it does not

17

rebut any of the claims that we've made allegedly of

18

fabrication.

19

inconsistent statements.

20

That's not disputed.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BREEZE:

This has nothing to do with any of her
He started kicking the back door.

There's nothing in there about It's another consistent statement.
But you can only bring in a statement

if we were making a claim that he

23

- if we were claiming,

24

never kicked in the door.

25

that up and fabricated that,

If we were claiming that she made
then they could come in and try
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1

to have a prior co~sistent - neither one of those address

2

something that's, t.hat we've challenged and "I grabbed my

3

phone and was yelling at him to leave the broke door and I

4

called 911.

THE COURT:

5

6

He took my phone and would not give it back."
To leave, period.

"He broke the door

in. I called 911."

7

MR.

BREEZE:

And none of these - there's been no

8

allegation that any of these particular statements are

9

fabricated.

"He was still yelling at me, that I owe him

10

money and will not give it back."

That is not - we are not,

11

we have not said that that is fabricated.
Then we got to the front door and he was s t i l l

12

13

trying to get my phone back or excuse me,

"I was still trying

14

to get my phone back" to call 911 and then - and so that last

15

statement arguably could be read in by the detective.

16

he pushed me and said,

17

her testimony that he pushed her.

18

that one.

19

down the stairs.

20

he got in his truck and I ran to the neighbor's house,

21

undisputed.

22

fabrication on.

she never claimed at any time during
And so they can't read in

And I should just push - or he should just push me
That is, could arguably come in.

But then
that's

That is not something that we've claimed

So the whole report doesn't come in.

23

Then

They can get

24

the detective up there and ask him, you know,

those three

25

sentences that are allegedly fabricated but the whole,

entire
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report does not come in.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. BREEZE:

4

THE COURT:

5

Is that everything?
Yes.
All right.

Does the State have a

response to that?
MR. STANGER:

6

Judge,

I think the rule, the rule of

7

completeness, I don't we can just put these bits and pie~es

8

in.

9

be able to judge for itself.

It has to be complete statement for the jury to read and
It goes to the weight of her

10

testimony and he's challenged her, as to her bias and

11

everything else.

12

completeness requires that we do this, that they be allowed

13

to look at it and judge for themselves.

So I think to get the complete, the rule of

14

MR. BREEZE:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. BREEZE:

17

THE COURT:

18

The hearsay rule You said you were done.
- the rule We're not going to go back and forth

and back and forth forever.
MR. BREEZE:

19

Okay, the hearsay rule says what it

20

says.

This alleged rule of completeness does not overrule

21

the hearsay rule.

22

the three that I pointed out, are prior consistent statements

23

that are going to be offered by the government to rebut an

24

implied or express charge of fabrication,

25

can come in.

These statements are, none of them except

only those three

I mean those are the ones that matter anyway.
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1

All right.

We have referred too much

2

to the statement of what's in it and what's not in i t to just

3

not let the jury read this paragraph.

4

State's Exhibit No.

4.

MR. BREEZE: And of course, we object and make n

5
6

motion for a mistrial.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BREEZE:

9

So I'm going to admit

You have objected.
I mean, it's clearly not admissible

and Your Honor wants to let it in for some reason that there

I'm unaware of any legal

10

is not, that is unknown to me.

11

authority to support your position.
THE COURT:

12

I have given you the legal authority to

13

support it.

14

keep pulling bits and piece of it out and expect that itrs

15

not going to go into evidence.
MR. BREEZE:

16
17

You have referred to it repeatedly.

That's what we do, we refresh

recollection -

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. BREEZE:

20

THE COURT:

21

You ca::1 't

We are done -

- through documents.
- discussing this topic.

I allowed you

to say everything you had to say and I'v8 ruled.

22

Are there any other topics we need to discuss?

23

MR. STANGER:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. STANGER:

Judge, the State wishes to play the The 911 tape.
Yep.
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1

MR. BREEZE:

2

THE COURT:

3

It's prejudicial I haven't heard the whole 911 tape.

Let me hear it.

4

MR. STANGER:

I have that.

I mean from the -

5

think we've already talked about - no putting the part

6

where the neighbor is talking.

7

THE COURT:

on

Uh-huh (affirmative).

(911 tape is played for the Court - not transcribed)

8

THE COURT:

9

10

MR. STANGER:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BREEZE:

13

THE COURT:

14

I

Any more clear with the volume down?
I can ....
No.

It's just (inaudible).

Do you want it up or down?
No,

it's, you know,

it's not any more

understandable either way.

15

(Tape played)

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BREEZE:

That's it?
I think so.

Here's the problem,

Your

18

Honor.

The - if they want to take statements out of this

19

tape so that they can rehabilitate her testimony by showing

20

that she made prior consistent statements, that's fine.

21

them take it step-by-step, statement-by-statement and let's

22

go through each one and see if it actually is admissible~

23

First we'll have to determine whether that particular

24

statement relates to some allegation of fabrication.

25

have to go and decide well is it too prejudicial and each

Let

Th<:n we
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I
1

statement in there has to be analyzed and because here's the

2

definition of statement - hearsay means a statement that

3

declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial

4

or hearing, definitely this; and a party offers in evidence

5

to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.

6

So obviously we've got a statement that she made while nut

7

testifying and I cannot imagine the State is offering i t for

8

any other reason that to claim that all these statements are

9

true and now if they're getting up to say, Hey, we're not

10

claiming that any of these statements are true, you know,

11

then they can claim that it's not hearsay but why would they

12

want to put it in and then tell the jury first that they're

13

not claiming it's true?
So it's all hearsay.

14

Some of it could possibly

15

come in as consistent prior statements but we have to get

16

each one itemized.

17

there's nothing really new in the whole tape that we hav~n't

18

already got testimony of.
THE COURT:

19
20

If you just listen to the whole thing,

Which makes it a prior consistent

statement except for the one that you pulled out.
MR. BREEZE:

21

Your Honor,

Well no,

it's - you're missing the

22

point,

23

there so we have to look at each sentence THE COURT:

24

25

they don't take each statement that's in

Yes,

I understood that and I listened

to all the statements and most of them has been testified to
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and is consistent with what she has said so far and is

2

consistent with what she has in this written statement except

3

for the uhe tried to push her down the stairs" versus

4

threatened to push me down the stairs."
MR. BREEZE:

5

First,

''he

it's they have to - you know -

6

they have to be able to identify a statement in there and

7

say, Hey, the defense made an implied charge of fabrication

8

against her with regard to this statement, therefore,

9

to play this statement to show that it's prior and i t ' s

10

we want

consistent.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BREEZE:

Yes,

I heard that.

And they cannot just play the whole

13

tape.

If you really look through this thing of the f~ve

14

minutes of the tape, there's probably about 17 seconds

15

consistent stateme~ts that are legitimate material here and

16

that's all and so we've got, you know,

17

seconds of irrelevant material that's prejudice,

18

irrelevant too.
THE COURT:

19

(Inaudible)

of

four minutes and 43
it's

stuff about the address and
The only reason I

20

the property out back and stuff like that.

21

don't want to let you play it because it's so horrible to

22

hear and there's no transcript to help the jury understand.

23

I mean,

24

some stuff that I can't even tell what it is and I hear some,

25

the one statement you pointed out that doesn't sound

it's -

I hear some consistent statements and I
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1

---~

consistent.

2

All right,

3

back in five minutes.

4

for ...

I'm going to think about it.

Let's be

The jury has already been out there

5

(Whereupon a recess was taken)

6

THE COURT:

Okay, we' re back ir, the matter of the

7

state of Utah vs. Ken Montey Johnson, outside the presence of

8

the jury.
Just wait a minute.

9

Umrnm, we discussed earlier the statement which I'm

10
11

going to allow and I was taking my time to make a decision on

12

the 911 tape.

13

the defendant's excitement on the tape. She testified that

14

she was still shaking as she stood at the front door and ran

15

out and called 911.

16

which are consistent with testimony she has given prior,

17

hear one that is not consistent.

18

State to play it based on excited utterance and then existing

19

emotional and physical condition as well as consistent

20

statements that have been brought into question now.

23

I've listened to the 911 tape, you can he~r

I hear many statements on that tape
I

I'm going to allow the

So if you want to put her back on the stand to do

21
22

Q

that,

go ahead or you can just play it.
MR. BREEZE:

One question, the -

I guess i t ' s

24

Exhibit No.

25

what was the legal justification for that one?

4,

the statement,

just so the record is clear,
I

just
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couldn't remember.
THE COURT:

2

It is now a consistent statement which

3

is offered to rebut and express an implied charge the

4

declarant recently fabricated it or acted from an improper

5

influence or motive.

6

influence or motive that she was trying to make this stuif up

7

in order to not have to pay money and you've also thrown into

8

question things that she did not include in here and so it

9

only seems fair that it should be put in to show the things

You've indicated she had an improp(=r

if we're

10

that she did include.

And again, on both of these,

11

going to show bits and pieces and constantly refer to them,

12

it only seems fair that the jury gets to hear it.

Okay.

13

So are you going to put her back on the stand?

14

MR.

15

(inaudible) Ms. Fowers.

16

trying to get her here since this morning.

17

on her way and didn't - is moving and did not,

18

wasn 1 t

19

her emails and Mr. Herbert was contacting her for me as well

20

trying to get her here.

21

don't -

22

respond as to how far she is away and she said she's chahging

23

her clothes and is on her way.

24

THE COURT:

25

STANGER:

Yes,
I

yeah,

I

don't know if Mr.

have subpoenaed her.

aware but I have - I mean,

I

I

have been

She is suppo~edly
said she

was in - I was sending

So she knew about this hearing.

she is the next witness.

You're calling Detective Herbert aren't

160
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I've tried to get her to

you?

···--·"-·-·-·-····- ··-·-·--··-········-··-•--··•- .- .. ---•-··••-•·

Breeze

- ---•·

.... , ... ···••-•··

··--·------·. ""--·······-·-··-··-···-----···•---·•·..-•.

---

ADDENDUMF

Victi1n's written witness statement (State's Exhibit #4)

Addendum F

....

S h:1ne Tl11dso11
Dt:ru,y Chd

Jarnc.:s i\'1. \Vinder
Sheriff, Sult Lnkc Count:,,

Scott Ca rvc:r

R

Urnb:·shc:riff

SALT

LAICE

Official Sta tement
/,J 01 iCt

~

-

You arc being "51,cd to give;; :;1aterr.cnt regarding the incident being investigated uncl::.r case number ~ -Which is c\nssified 2s an _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __
76-8-504 Written False Stateinc:nt .
A person is guilty of a class n misdcincm1or if;(~) with intent to dcc~i ·,c a public servant in the pe:·fonnancc o f his official funct ion, he: a ) tv! akcs any
written false sla,cment which he does not believe !O be rr:i,1c.
(Uwh Code Annot,Hcd )
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